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ARTICLES 
SPEAK NOW OR HOLD YOUR PEACE:  
PREARBITRATION EXPRESS WAIVERS OF 
EVIDENT-PARTIALITY CHALLENGES 
EDWARD C. DAWSON* 
This Article proposes that parties and arbitrators should use, and courts 
should enforce, express prearbitration waivers of certain evident-partiality 
challenges as a way to avoid uncertainty and expense caused by widely-
acknowledged disarray in the doctrine of evident partiality.  Courts 
considering evident-partiality cases mainly have focused on (and disagreed 
about) the content of the doctrine and the circumstances in which a party can 
constructively waive an evident-partiality challenge by failing to object to an 
arbitrator despite knowing about a particular relationship.  Similarly, the 
academic literature examining evident partiality has focused on the 
appropriate judicial test for assessing partiality, rules for defining the scope of 
an arbitrator’s duty to disclose, and proposals for reconciling the division in 
the courts.  This Article takes a different approach.  It is the first examination 
of the use of party waivers to cut off judicial evident-partiality challenges and 
avoid the uncertainties in the doctrine.  The solution proposed in this Article is 
that parties can consensually avoid the current uncertainty over evident-
partiality doctrine through express prearbitration agreements to waive certain 
judicial challenges.  This Article explains why using express evident-partiality 
waivers should be attractive to parties.  It also argues that courts should be 
willing to enforce such waivers under the Federal Arbitration Act.  Enforcing 
them is theoretically consistent with arbitration’s fundamental policies of 
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resolving disputes based on the parties’ consent and allowing the parties to 
choose for themselves the most efficient procedures to resolve their dispute.  
These policies are strongly reinforced by recent Supreme Court opinions in other 
areas of arbitration law.   
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the few ways a losing party can challenge the result of an 
arbitration in an American court1 is to argue that the arbitrator 
displayed “evident partiality” that tainted the arbitration.2  Evident 
partiality essentially means that either the arbitrator was actually 
biased in favor of a party, or there were facts unknown to the 
parties that could make an objective observer think the arbitrator 
was biased.3 
Beyond that essence, however, courts and theorists are and have 
long been deeply divided about the content and the application of 
the doctrine of evident partiality, offering different formulations of 
the evident-partiality test and reaching conflicting results in similar 
cases.4  At the same time, judicial reduction of alternative avenues to 
challenge arbitration awards, such as “manifest disregard” of law or 
                                                          
 1. This Article focuses on the confirmation of arbitration awards in U.S. federal 
and state courts, primarily under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 
(2012), and analogous state statutes.  Most state arbitration acts are modeled on the 
FAA, including their evident-partiality provisions.  See, e.g., Stephen K. Huber, The 
Arbitration Jurisprudence of the Fifth Circuit:  Round IV, 35 TEX. TECH L. REV. 463, 501 
(2004) (discussing the resolution of arbitration cases through federal and state law).  
Also, many state courts look to federal jurisprudence, especially U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions, to interpret their statutes.  See e.g., Daiichi Haw. Real Estate Corp. v. 
Lichter, 82 P.3d 411, 425–34 (Haw. 2003) (surveying Supreme Court jurisprudence 
to define statutory terms); Burlington N. R.R. v. TUCO Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 632–37 
(Tex. 1997) (examining Supreme Court jurisprudence and circuit court precedent 
regarding issues that commonly arise in disputes centered on the arbitrator himself); 
Richco Structures v. Parkside Vill., Inc., 263 N.W.2d 204, 211–12 (Wis. 1978) (same).   
In particular, state courts often interpret evident-partiality doctrine under state 
statutes by reference to the FAA and federal cases, particularly the Supreme Court’s 
seminal decision in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 
(1968).  See e.g., Gonzales v. Interinsurance Exch., 148 Cal. Rptr. 282, 285 (Ct. App. 
1978) (looking to Commonwealth Coatings for guidance on interpretation of 
California’s arbitrator-bias standard); Beebe Med. Ctr., Inc. v. InSight Health Servs. 
Corp., 751 A.2d 426, 432 (Del. Ch. 1999) (looking to the FAA and Commonwealth 
Coatings decision for guidance in interpreting meaning of evident partiality under 
Delaware Uniform Arbitration Act); Drinane v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 606 
N.E.2d 1181, 1184 (Ill. 1992) (applying Commonwealth Coatings to interpretation of 
bias standard under Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act); TUCO, 960 S.W.2d at 632–37 
(relying upon federal jurisprudence interpreting the FAA and noting how divisions 
in the federal case law have confused and divided state courts interpreting state 
statutes).  Therefore, this Article analyzes the current divisions in evident-partiality 
doctrine, and proposes an express-waiver solution, in terms of the generalized 
doctrine as applied both in federal and state American courts. 
 2. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (allowing judicial vacatur of an arbitration award “where 
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them”). 
 3. See Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 147 (explaining that in addition to 
meaning actual bias, it also means concealed material information).  Evident 
partiality also includes actual bias, but because most of the litigation and uncertainty 
in this area involves challenges based on claims of objective impressions or 
appearances of bias.  This Article uses “evident partiality” to refer to those types of 
challenges.  See infra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra Part I.B. 
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facts,5 has increased pressure on the fractured evident-partiality 
doctrine.  “Manifest disregard” refers to the judicially-crafted doctrine 
allowing vacatur of an award based on the “manifest disregard” of 
facts or law by the arbitral panel.6  With greater frequency, 
disappointed losing parties mount evident-partiality challenges as 
their best hope for overturning an award.  As a result, before an 
arbitration, parties face significant uncertainty and the unattractive 
possibility of extended, expensive post-arbitration litigation of an 
evident-partiality challenge. 
While courts and scholars wrestle with defining and rationalizing 
evident partiality, this Article recommends a different approach:  
Parties can use express, prearbitration7 waivers of evident-partiality 
objections to reduce uncertainty and increase efficiency by 
foreclosing a large number of the most inefficient type of evident-
partiality challenges.  The Article’s core argument is that concerned 
parties can use waivers to avoid the muddle of current evident-
partiality doctrine.  At the same time, courts should enforce these 
waivers as consistent with arbitration’s fundamental principles of 
consensual dispute resolution and procedural efficiency.8 
After this introduction, Part II gives background about the doctrine 
of evident partiality, explaining its origins and purposes, and 
describing the workings of the pre-arbitration disclosure process and 
post-award judicial evident-partiality challenges.  It then introduces 
the problem caused by current and enduring uncertainties about the 
content and application of the evident-partiality doctrine, combined 
with the increased pressure placed on the doctrine’s disuniformities 
by the judicial elimination or narrowing of other avenues to 
challenge arbitral awards, such as “manifest disregard.” 
                                                          
 5. See Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(explaining that a finding of manifest disregard requires more than a minor error in 
the application of law; instead manifest disregard requires, for example, that an 
arbitrator correctly state the law and then proceed by failing to apply it). 
 6. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 7. “Prearbitration” is used in this Article to mean “after the arbitration process 
has begun but before the arbitration hearing,” and not “prior to any arbitration 
proceedings being initiated.” 
 8. I encountered the idea for a prearbitration express waiver of evident-
partiality while working on one of the cases discussed in this Article, Ponderosa Pine 
Energy, LLC v. Tenaska Energy, Inc., 376 S.W.3d 358 (Tex. App. 2012).  In that case, 
the arbitral panel—specifically, the chief arbitrator, Justice Baker—issued an order 
stating that the parties had agreed to waive any conflicts.  Id. at 362.  Ultimately, the 
appellate court reversed the district court’s decision to invalidate the award based 
upon the theory of “constructive waiver,” see infra notes 67–69 and accompanying 
text, rather than analyzing the waiver order in the arbitral record.  Ponderosa Pine, 
376 S.W.3d at 376.  In the interest of full disclosure, I have no financial interest in 
the outcome of that case, which is now pending before the Texas Supreme Court.     
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Part III argues that litigants ought to use, and judges ought to 
enforce, express waivers of evident-partiality objections as a way to 
avoid the problems created by the current disarray in and pressure 
on the doctrine.  This Part first explains how an express-waiver 
procedure would work, and focuses on express waivers that would bar 
evident-partiality challenges based on relationships that are somehow 
disclosed by the arbitrator prior to the arbitration.  It then explains 
the practical virtues of express waivers to parties by showing how they 
can greatly reduce the problems and uncertainties created by the 
current fractures in evident-partiality doctrine.  Finally, it offers a 
theoretical argument for judicial enforcement of these waivers that is 
rooted in arbitration’s fundamental principles of mutual consent and 
procedural efficiency.  This argument is connected to recent 
Supreme Court jurisprudence in other areas of arbitration law that 
emphasizes parties’ ability and flexibility to determine by consent the 
procedures that will govern their arbitration. 
Part IV addresses potential objections to the use and enforcement 
of express, pre-arbitration waivers of evident partiality challenges.  
Among the objections addressed are arguments that enforcing 
express waivers would create bad incentives for arbitrators to be less 
than forthcoming in their disclosures, conflict with arbitration 
statutes or arbitral rules, and worsen the unfairness caused by binding 
arbitration agreements in consumer and employment law.  This 
Article argues that the proposal is consistent with arbitration statutes 
and rules.  If properly limited to challenges based on disclosed 
relationships, the proposal has minimal potential for sanctioning 
fraud or unfairness and would allow the parties a fair amount of 
flexibility to determine the scope of waivers for themselves.  
Furthermore, general concerns about the unfairness of certain kinds 
of arbitration are not a good reason to refuse to enforce the 
proposed waivers because the current disorder in evident-partiality 
doctrine is not a good safety valve for unfairness in particular types of 
arbitration agreements.   
I. EVIDENT-PARTIALITY DOCTRINE:  BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM 
A. Evident Partiality and the Arbitration Disclosure Process 
1. Evident partiality-doctrine:  Origins and core content 
Under most domestic arbitration statutes, including the Federal 
Arbitration Act, there are only a few prescribed avenues to oppose 
judicial confirmation of an arbitration award issued by an arbitral 
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panel.9  The avenues are limited by design because one of 
arbitration’s most important purposes as an alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism is to increase efficiency10, in part by 
avoiding, or at least limiting, collateral judicial proceedings to 
confirm the award.11 
One of the few available statutory bases for opposing award 
confirmation in court is a challenge based on “evident partiality,” 
which is the focus of this Article.12  The statutory evident-partiality 
doctrine allows a challenger to vacate an award by showing that the 
arbitrator was biased or was unfit to serve based on facts13 that would 
indicate that he might be biased.  Since Commonwealth Coatings Corp. 
v. Continental Casualty Corp.,14 the Supreme Court’s first and only 
                                                          
 9. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 11 (2012) (discussing the procedure for modifying and 
challenging awards). 
 10. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) 
(describing arbitration as “usually cheaper and faster than litigation; it can have 
simpler procedural and evidentiary rules . . . it is often more flexible in regard to 
scheduling of times and places of hearings and discovery devices” (quoting H.R. REP. 
NO. 97–542, at 13 (1982))); R. Wilson Freyermuth, Foreclosure by Arbitration?, 37 PEPP. 
L. REV. 459, 477 (2010) (“By allowing the parties to select their own decision maker, 
procedural rules and timetables, and substantive rules of decision, and by according 
finality to the award, arbitration ostensibly permits parties to create a dispute 
resolution process that can produce a final result much more rapidly than public 
adjudication.”).  But see Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World:  A Plea for 
Reassessing Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 434 (2000) 
(arguing that “arbitration’s technical advantages” are “seriously eroded”); Thomas J. 
Stipanowich, Arbitration:  The “New Litigation”, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2010) (noting 
that it is now common to speak of arbitration as judicialized, formal, costly, time-
consuming, and subject to hardball advocacy). 
 11. See, e.g., Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013) 
(“Under the FAA, courts may vacate an arbitrator’s decision only in very unusual 
circumstances.  That limited judicial review, we have explained, maintain[s] 
arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.  If parties could take 
full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals, arbitration would become merely a prelude to 
a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process.” (alteration in 
original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. 
v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 (2010) (describing the “high 
hurdle” challengers must cross to vacate an arbitral award). 
 12. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2).  The other statutory bases for vacatur under the FAA are 
(1) “where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means,” (2) 
“where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct,” and (3) “where the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and 
definite award on the subject was not made”).  Id. § 10(a)(1), (3)–(4). 
 13. In theory, the facts must have been unknown to the challenging party until 
after the arbitration, but in practice there is much division and uncertainty about 
exactly when an evident-partiality challenge will fail because it is based on “known” 
facts.  Infra Part II.B. 
 14. 393 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1968) (“We can perceive no way in which the 
effectiveness of the arbitration process will be hampered by the simple requirement 
that arbitrators disclose to the parties any dealings that might create an impression of 
possible bias. . . .  [A]ny tribunal . . . not only must be unbiased but also must avoid 
even the appearance of bias.  We cannot believe that it was the purpose of Congress 
to authorize litigants to submit their cases and controversies to arbitration boards 
that might reasonably be thought biased against one litigant and favorable to 
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decision interpreting this provision, it is clear that evident partiality 
includes not only actual bias but also an objective “impression of 
possible bias.”  Further, since an “impression of bias” is easier to show 
than actual bias, most parties raising “evident partiality” challenges 
focus on trying to show facts that create an impression of bias.15  This 
Article similarly focuses primarily on these “objective” evident 
partiality challenges. 
In broad terms, the essential components of an objective evident-
partiality challenge are 1) that the arbitrator had a significant 
relationship with a party or party counsel 2) that could or would have 
caused an objective observer to think she was biased, and 3) that she 
did not sufficiently disclose that relationship to allow the other party 
to make an informed decision to proceed despite the conflict.16  So, 
for example, a core case of evident partiality might be one where the 
arbitrator was a close personal friend of counsel for one of the parties 
to the arbitration, and entirely failed to disclose that relationship to 
the opposing party.17  Beyond these broad terms and the core of 
factually easy cases, however, there is extensive and longstanding 
uncertainty as to what suffices to show evident partiality.18 
                                                          
another.”).  For an explanation of the difference between actual bias and impression 
of bias, see, for example, Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial 
Arbitration:  Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial 
Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443, 455 n.47 (1998), which discusses the 
different standards of proof between “impression of bias” and “actual bias” cases.  See 
also Roger J. Perlstadt, Comment, Timing of Institutional Bias Challenges to Arbitration, 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1983, 1996–97 (2002) (noting that although “[t]he text of Section 
10 [of the FAA] implies that ‘evident partiality’ must be shown by proof of actual 
bias,” courts have adopted less stringent standards). 
 15. See, e.g., Stephen K. Huber, State Regulation of Arbitration Proceedings:  Judicial 
Review of Arbitration Awards by State Courts, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 509, 548 
(2009) (“Proof of actual bias is all but impossible, short of a string of incriminating e-
mails, so apparent bias is the only realistic option for establishing that vacatur is 
warranted.”); Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity:  A Unitary Theory of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1061–62 (2000) 
(describing proof of actual bias as “both rare and difficult” as juxtaposed with proof 
of “evident” bias); see also Eric Lucentini, Comment, Taking a Fresh Look at Vacatur of 
Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 7 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 359, 362 (1996) (“[I]f a 
party can show ‘evident partiality’ under the FAA merely by identifying a relationship 
between an arbitrator and an opposing party, her task will be far easier than if she 
must show that an arbitrator actually behaved in a partial manner.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 146–50 (comparing corrupt 
arbitration proceedings to rulings from a partial court). 
 17. See, e.g., Karlseng v. Cooke, 346 S.W.3d 85, 87–93 (Tex. App. 2011) (holding 
that the arbitrator was required to disclose his social relationship with an attorney 
who represented a party to the arbitration). 
 18. Indeed, almost every component just described is a subject of division and 
uncertainty, including what is a sufficiently significant relationship to create the 
impression of partiality, how strong the objective impression has to be to establish 
evident partiality, and when the arbitrator has disclosed enough about a relationship 
to prevent it being the basis of a post-award evident-partiality challenge.  See infra 
Part I.B. 
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2. Evident partiality-process:  Arbitrators’ disclosures and judicial challenges 
The success of any judicial evident-partiality challenge heavily 
depends on, and is often determined by, the pre-arbitration process 
for arbitrators to fulfill their duty to disclose any potential conflicts.  
Arbitrators have a continuing ethical duty to disclose any potential 
conflicts:  material relationships that might give an impression of 
partiality.19  Evident-partiality doctrine operates, in part, as a way to 
police the arbitrator’s fulfillment of this duty, since an arbitrator who 
fails to disclose a significant relationship or fails to disclose it in 
sufficient detail risks vacatur of the award.20 
To allow arbitrators to fulfill their duty to disclose, many arbitral 
rules provide a process for the arbitrator to make these disclosures.21  
They also often provide a process for parties to object to an arbitrator 
based on information in the disclosures, and for resolving that 
                                                          
 19. See, e.g., THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 
Canon II.C, available at http://www.abanet.org/dispute/commercial_disputes.pdf 
(listing the types of relationships and interests arbitrators must disclose and stating 
that “[t]he obligation to disclose [these] interests or relationships . . . is a continuing 
duty which requires a person who accepts appointment as an arbitrator to disclose, as 
soon as practicable, at any stage of the arbitration any such interests or relationships 
which may arise, or which are recalled or discovered”); see also UNCITRAL 
ARBITRATION RULES Art. 11 (United Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 2010), 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised 
/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf (“An arbitrator, from the time of his or her 
appointment and throughout the arbitral proceedings, shall without delay disclose 
any such circumstances to the parties and the other arbitrators unless they have 
already been informed by him or her of these circumstances.”); COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES R. 16(a) (Am. Arbitration Ass’n 2009), available at 
http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_004103&revision 
=latestreleased (“Any person appointed or to be appointed as an arbitrator shall 
disclose to the AAA any circumstance likely to give rise to justifiable doubt as to the 
arbitrator’s impartiality or independence, including any bias or any financial or 
personal interest in the result of the arbitration or any past or present relationship 
with the parties or their representatives.  Such obligation shall remain in effect 
throughout the arbitration.”); JAMS STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES 
R. 12(i) (Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Servs., Inc. 2009), available at http://www 
.jamsadr.com/rules-streamlined-arbitration/#Rule12 (“The obligation of the 
Arbitrator to make all required disclosures continues throughout the 
Arbitration process.”).  
 20. See, e.g., Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 1994) (describing how 
arbitrators’ obligations under the evident-partiality doctrine “gives arbitrators an 
incentive to be forthright with the parties, honestly disclosing what arbitrators might 
otherwise have an incentive to hide”).  
 21. The disclosure process varies only slightly under various arbitral rules.  
Compare COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES R. 16 
(obligating disclosure to the AAA, which then communicates the information to the 
parties), with UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES Art. 11  (requiring disclosure to the 
parties and the other arbitrators).  Both the AAA and UNCITRAL rules require 
disclosure of anything that might give rise to “justifiable doubt about the arbitrator’s 
impartiality or dependence” throughout the entire arbitral proceeding.  COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES R. 16; see also UNCITRAL 
ARBITRATION RULES Art. 11 (requiring disclosure of “justifiable doubts” of an 
arbitrator’s impartiality). 
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objection.22  While there are variations, often the way the disclosure 
process works is that the arbitrators23 disclose, and the parties may ask 
follow-up questions.24  Then, if neither party objects to any 
arbitrator’s serving, or if a party unsuccessfully challenges one of the 
panelists, the arbitration proceeds.25 
In particular, the disclosure process (and the flexibility of that 
process) may vary depending on whether the arbitration is ad hoc or 
institutional, a decision made by the parties in their arbitration 
agreement—that is, the initial contract or contractual clause under 
which the parties agree to use arbitration to resolve dispute, and 
specify the rules that will govern any arbitration.26  Institutional 
                                                          
 22. See, e.g., UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES Art. 12 (detailing the avenues for 
challenging and removing an arbitrator and explaining reasons for such challenges, 
including if there are justifiable doubts about the arbitrator’s partiality or an 
arbitrator’s failure to act). 
 23. This supposes that there is a three-arbitrator panel, with two party-nominated 
arbitrators and a third chosen jointly by the party nominees.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 146 (1968) 
(involving an arbitration agreement with this type of procedure).  In that scenario, 
each party will scrutinize the disclosures of its opponent’s nominee and the jointly-
chosen third.  Party-proposed arbitrators may either be neutral or partial, but this 
Article focuses only on neutrals since evident-partiality challenges can only be made 
against neutral arbitrators.  See, e.g., Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council 
Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussing the history of 
evident partiality in the “neutral arbitrator” context established by Commonwealth 
Coatings); Deseriee A. Kennedy, Predisposed with Integrity:  The Elusive Quest for Justice in 
Tripartite Arbitrations, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 749, 776 (1995) (noting that most courts 
“refuse to find a non-neutral arbitrator capable of evident partiality as . . . non-
neutral arbitrators are permitted to be predisposed toward their nominating party”).  
There also may be a sole arbitrator (who must always be neutral), in which case both 
parties will scrutinize his disclosures.  See generally Toby Landau, Composition and 
Establishment of the Tribunal, 9 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 45, 48–58 (1998) (describing the 
selection and retention of a sole arbitrator). 
 24. See e.g., Stone v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 872 F. Supp. 2d 435, 440–41 (E.D. Pa. 
2012) (noting FINRA instruction to arbitrators to invite questions after disclosure); 
McKinney Drilling Co. v. Mach I Ltd. P’ship, 359 A.2d 100, 102 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1976) (demonstrating the court’s ability to allow parties to ask further questions 
about an arbitrator’s disclosure); Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC v. Tenaska Energy, 
Inc., 376 S.W.3d 358, 372 (Tex. App. 2012) (noting parties’ ability to ask questions); 
Ruth V. Glick, Arbitrator Disclosure:  Recommendation for a New UAA Standard, 13 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 89, 101 (1997) (“[P]arties may waive objections to the 
appearance of bias, request more information about the relationship from the 
arbitrator, or challenge the arbitrator for cause.”). 
 25. Since this Article is about express pre-arbitration waivers of evident-partiality 
challenges, scenarios in which a party does raise a challenge are not relevant. It is 
worth noting, however, that raising a prearbitration challenge preserves it challenge 
for judicial review, and that prearbitration challenges are made and resolved under 
the applicable arbitral rules.  See, e.g., UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES Art. 12 
(providing procedure for challenging arbitrator). 
 26. See, e.g., Maya Ganguly, Tribunals and Taxation:  An Investigation of Arbitration 
in Recent U.S. Tax Conventions, 29 WIS. INT’L L.J. 735, 740–43 (2011) (explaining this 
distinction); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Creating a Market for Justice; A Market Incentive 
Solution to Regulating the Playing Field:  Judicial Deference, Judicial Review, Due Process, and 
Fair Play in Online Consumer Arbitration, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 19 (2002) (same).  
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arbitrations are conducted by organizations (like the American 
Arbitration Association) that administer the arbitration’s procedures, 
including arbitrator selection, disclosure, and the arbitration itself.27  
They then proceed under the arbitral rules of the administering 
tribunal.28  In an ad hoc arbitration, there is no administering 
organization, and the arbitration is conducted either based on rules 
specified in the parties’ arbitration agreement or by rules agreed to 
by consent.29  Ad hoc arbitrations generally allow more procedural 
flexibility, including in the disclosure process.30  This Article 
therefore focuses initially on the more flexible ad hoc arbitration, 
because this makes it easier to explain the general idea of an express 
waiver of evident-partiality challenges without bogging down 
discussing the details of how a waiver might work under various sets 
of arbitral rules. 
After the arbitration is concluded, the losing party may raise an 
evident-partiality challenge and attempt to persuade a court to vacate 
the award by showing facts demonstrating the arbitrator’s evident 
partiality.31  The essence of the challenge will be that the arbitrator 
had an undisclosed or insufficiently disclosed relationship with a 
                                                          
 27. See Ganguly, supra note 26, at 740 n.26 (citing the American Arbitration 
Association and London Court of International Arbitration as examples of arbitral 
institutions); see also William K. Slate II, International Arbitration:  Do Institutions Make a 
Difference?, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 41, 47 (1996) (including the ICC International 
Court of Arbitration and the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission as “leading institutions”). 
 28. Ganguly, supra note 26, at 740. 
 29. E.g., Slate, supra note 27, at 52–53.  The parties may specify free-standing 
arbitral rules, such as the UNCITRAL rules, see Ganguly, supra note 26, at 743, or 
rules promulgated by an institutional arbitrator, such as the AAA rules.  See Slate, 
supra note 26, at 52–53 (explaining preference for institutional rather than ad hoc 
arbitration).  But see Ganguly, supra note 26, at 743 (“Because each institution’s 
rules refer to the institution, these rules are not a good choice to use as a model 
for ad hoc arbitration.”). 
 30. See Ganguly, supra note 26, at 740–43 (advantages of an institutional 
arbitration include administrative execution and oversight by the tribunal, while 
advantages of an ad hoc arbitration are that is cheaper and more flexible); see also 
Slate, supra note 27, at 52–53 (arguing that institutional arbitration is superior to ad 
hoc arbitration).  Many arbitral rule sets allow parties to modify or supersede 
procedures by agreement, which would permit use of the waiver procedure described 
in this Article.  See, e.g., JAMS STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES R. 2 
(Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Servs., Inc. 2009) (“The Parties may agree on any 
procedures not specified herein or in lieu of these Rules . . . .  The Party-agreed 
procedures shall be enforceable as if contained in these Rules.”). 
 31. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012).  See generally Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating 
International Arbitrators:  A Functional Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 53, 78–81 (2005) (describing evident partiality as an avenue for 
vacatur of an arbitral award). 
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party or their lawyer (e.g., financial, friendly, or familial) that creates 
a perception of partiality.32 
Judicial evident-partiality challenges can be further divided into 
two broad groups:  challenges based on claims that an arbitrator 
entirely failed to disclose a significant relationship,33 and challenges 
based on claims that the arbitrator failed to disclose sufficient facts 
about a disclosed relationship to apprise the parties of its true 
significance.34  As to the latter sort of challenge, most courts hold that 
a party constructively waives evident-partiality challenges based on 
relationships or facts it knew about, but did not object to, at the time 
of the arbitration.35  Ideally, then, evident-partiality challenges should 
be about only relationships that the arbitrator should have disclosed, 
but did not disclose, that create the appearance of partiality.36  However, 
the content and application of this doctrine of constructive waiver,37 
like the parent doctrine of evident partiality, is unclear, and there are 
many court cases litigated over whether the arbitrator’s disclosure of 
a relationship was sufficient to trigger a waiver.38 
When an evident-partiality challenge is raised, there is often 
significant discovery and litigation inquiring into the sufficiency of 
the arbitrator’s disclosures.39  The trial court that considers the 
evident-partiality challenge will decide whether the award should be 
vacated after weighing the arbitrator’s duty to disclose, the scope, 
                                                          
 32. See, e.g., Karlseng v. Cooke, 346 S.W.3d 85, 96 (Tex. App. 2011) (arbitrator 
had social relationship with attorney who represented a party to the arbitration). 
 33. See, e.g., Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
668 F.3d 60, 72 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Among the circumstances under which the 
evident-partiality standard is likely to be met are those in which an arbitrator fails 
to disclose a relationship or interest that is strongly suggestive of bias in favor of 
one of the parties.”). 
 34. This distinction becomes important when considering the possible scope of 
an express waiver of evident-partiality objections.  See infra Parts II.A, III.D-E. 
 35. See, e.g., JCI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 
F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that a party “which was put on notice of the risk 
when it signed the contract [and] chose not to inquire about the backgrounds of the 
Committee members either before or during the hearing” waived the right to 
challenge the decision based on evident partiality); Kiernan v. Piper Jaffray Cos., 137 
F.3d 588, 593 (8th Cir. 1998) (“While they did not have full knowledge of all the 
relationships to which they now object, they did have concerns about [the 
arbitrator’s] impartiality and yet chose to have her remain on the panel rather than 
spend time and money investigating further until losing the arbitration.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 147 
(1968) (focusing on an “undisclosed business relationship”). 
 37. Courts discussing this sort of waiver usually simply refer to it as waiver, see, for 
example, JCI Commc’ns, 325 F.3d at 52, but this Article uses the phrase “constructive 
waiver” to distinguish it from the express waiver endorsed by this Article. 
 38. See infra Part I.B. 
 39. E.g., Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 F.3d 
278, 285 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (decrying the “[e]xpensive satellite litigation” 
over non-disclosures that stems from evident-partiality objections). 
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timing, and sufficiency of the disclosure, and the materiality of the 
undisclosed information.40  Different courts strike this balance in 
different ways, resulting in significant divisions in evident-partiality 
doctrine.41  The next part examines the divisions in the application of 
evident partiality and the sub-doctrine of constructive waiver, and the 
increased pressure placed on these uncertain doctrines by the 
Supreme Court’s reduction in alternative avenues to challenge 
arbitral awards. 
B. Problem:  Evident-Partiality Doctrine Is Fractured and Under Increasing 
Pressure 
Evident partiality-doctrine is currently both uncertain—with courts 
widely divided over the content and application of the doctrine—and 
under increasing pressure.  This means that prior to arbitration 
parties may have well-justified fears that any award they win may be 
subjected to an extended evident-partiality challenge where the result 
is unpredictable, and at best there will be expensive, protracted, and 
intrusive litigation to confirm the award. 
1. Disarray in evident-partiality doctrine 
Evident-partiality doctrine is currently in disarray, with courts 
disagreeing on how to phrase the evident-partiality standard, among 
many other subsidiary questions.  The confusion over the meaning of 
evident partiality stems from the Supreme Court first (and only) 
decision attempting to define the term—the 1968 opinion in 
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. 
There were two leading opinions in Commonwealth Coatings, which 
is one source of the current confusion.  Justice Black’s “majority”42 
opinion adopted an exacting standard of disclosure that allowed 
vacatur of an award based on showing a mere “impression of possible 
bias” and required arbitrators to “avoid even the appearance of 
bias.”43  Justice White, however, wrote a concurrence that advocated 
what has been interpreted as a stricter standard requiring not just an 
                                                          
 40. See e.g., Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. v. Saint Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 
668 F.3d 60, 73–74 (2d Cir. 2012) (weighing these factors); ANR Coal Co. v. 
Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 500 (4th Cir. 1999) (same). 
 41. See infra Part I.B. 
 42. Or plurality opinion, depending on whom you ask.  See infra note 46. 
 43. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149–50 
(1968) (“We can perceive no way in which the effectiveness of the arbitration process 
will be hampered by the simple requirement that arbitrators disclose to the parties 
any dealings that might create an impression of possible bias. . . .  [A]ny tribunal . . . 
not only must be unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance of bias.”). 
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appearance of bias, but a reasonable impression of it.44  His 
concurrence has grown in influence as courts (particularly federal 
courts) have become friendlier to arbitration.45  Lower courts, both 
federal and state, have disagreed over which opinion to follow and 
even over whether Justice Black’s opinion is actually a majority 
opinion.46  They have also differed widely in their interpretation and 
application of the tests laid out by both opinions.47  Thus, while there 
is a core of agreement that evident partiality requires a challenger to 
prove facts showing some sort of appearance of partiality by the 
arbitrator,48 courts do not agree about what formulation of the 
evident-partiality doctrine will best accomplish its goals. 
Part of the reason for this confusion is that there are conflicting 
goals, or policies, behind evident-partiality doctrine.  This tension is 
reflected in the original Commonwealth Coatings division of opinion 
and the deepening, and increasingly complicated, divisions in lower 
courts.  Policies supporting extensive disclosure (and a 
correspondingly robust judicial role in invalidating awards for 
insufficient disclosure) include the basic need for fairness,49 the 
                                                          
 44. Id. at 150–52 (White, J., concurring); see Merrick T. Rossein & Jennifer Hope, 
Disclosure and Disqualification Standards for Neutral Arbitrators:  How Far to Cast the Net 
and What Is Sufficient to Vacate Award, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 203, 209 (2007) (“Because 
it is generally accepted as a plurality opinion, Commonwealth Coatings has left courts 
free to reject ‘evident partiality’ as the broad ‘appearance of bias’ standard in favor 
of (what has been interpreted as) Justice White’s more narrow standard requiring 
disclosure of relationships such that a ‘reasonable person would . . . conclude that an 
arbitrator was partial.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640, 647 (6th Cir. 2005))). 
 45. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150–52 (White, J., concurring); Positive 
Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 281–83 (5th Cir. 
2007) (analyzing Justice White’s concurrence and other courts’ interpretations of the 
effect of the concurrence on the majority opinion’s holding); Rogers, supra note 31, 
at 79 (“Judicial fallout from this supreme confusion [over the effect of Justice White’s 
concurrence on the majority opinion] has been, predictably, even more confused.”).  
For a general discussion of the broader trend from judicial hostility towards judicial 
friendliness to arbitration, see Michael A. Scodro, Deterrence and Implied Limits on 
Arbitral Power, 55 DUKE L.J. 547, 553–65 (2005) (describing the change from judicial 
hostility to a “new, more generous view” of arbitration). 
 46. Compare Positive Software Solutions, 476 F.3d at 282 (“A majority of circuit 
courts have concluded that Justice White’s [concurring] opinion did not lend 
majority status to the plurality opinion.”), with Burlington N. R.R. v. TUCO Inc., 960 
S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex. 1997) (criticizing “some lower federal courts” for “treating 
Justice Black’s opinion as a mere plurality” and rejecting its “suggestion that ‘evident 
partiality’ is met by an ‘appearance of bias’”).  
 47. See infra notes 61–69 (describing the many judicial points of disagreement 
about how to interpret and apply evident-partiality doctrine). 
 48. See e.g., Perlstadt, supra note 14, at 1997 (noting that “several circuit courts 
have adopted a standard somewhere between an ‘appearance of bias’ standard and 
the ‘actual bias’ standard that the text of Section 10 [of the FAA] implies”). 
 49. See, e.g., Barcon Assocs., Inc. v. Tri-Cnty. Asphalt Corp., 430 A.2d 214, 218–19 
(N.J. 1981) (noting, in vacating the award that “[a] necessary corollary of the fact 
that arbitrators function with the support, encouragement and enforcement power 
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desire to have parties prospectively rather than courts retrospectively 
evaluate the significance of potential conflicts,50 and the recognition 
that the perception of fairness is particularly important in arbitration 
precisely because judicial review is so constrained.51  Policies 
supporting a more demanding standard for showing evident partiality 
include the inefficiency of requiring every arbitrator to disclose her 
“complete and unexpurgated business biography,”52 the need for 
finality,53 the loss of arbitration’s efficiency advantages if awards are 
routinely subject to protracted judicial challenges,54 the desire to 
limit sandbagging and trumped-up challenges,55 and the recognition 
that not all relationships are sufficiently material to create an 
impression of partiality.56 
                                                          
of the state is the requirement that they adhere to high standards of honest, fairness 
and impartiality. . . .  [I]t is our strongly held view that honest, fair and impartial 
arbitration is as important as the finality of arbitration”). 
 50. See, e.g., TUCO, 960 S.W.2d at 635. 
 51. See Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 149 (“[W]e should, if anything, be 
even more scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators than judges, since 
the former have completely free rein to decide the law as well as the facts and are not 
subject to appellate review.”).  But see id. at 150 (White, J., concurring) (“The Court 
does not decide today that arbitrators are to be held to the standards of judicial 
decorum of Article III judges, or indeed of any judges.”). 
 52. Id. at 151 (White, J., concurring). 
 53. See, e.g., Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 
F.3d 278, 285 (5th Cir. 2007) (warning that awarding vacatur even in cases involving 
than full disclosure might “seriously jeopardize the finality of arbitration”); Merit Ins. 
Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 683 (7th Cir. 1983) (“We do not want to 
encourage the losing party to every arbitration to conduct a background 
investigation of each of the arbitrators in an effort to uncover evidence of a former 
relationship with the adversary.  This would only increase the cost and undermine 
the finality of arbitration, contrary to the purpose of the U.S. Arbitration Act of 
making arbitration a swift, inexpensive, and effective substitute for judicial dispute 
resolution.”); see also Rogers, supra note 31, at 117 (“Proponents of broadened 
disclosure obligations emphasize the need for ‘impartiality’ or ‘fairness,’ while 
opponents emphasize the potential to undercut finality . . . .”). 
 54. E.g., Merit Ins. Co., 714 F.2d at 683 (describing vacatur as “open[ing] a new 
and, we fear, an interminable chapter in the efforts of people who have chosen 
arbitration and been disappointed in their choice”). 
 55. See, e.g., Positive Software Solutions, 476 F.3d at 285 (“Just as happened here, 
losing parties would have an incentive to conduct intensive, after-the-fact 
investigations to discover the most trivial of relationships, most of which they likely 
would not have objected to if disclosure had been made.”); Nat’l Wrecking Co. v. 
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 731, 990 F.2d 957, 960 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Parties . . . 
cannot stand by during arbitration, withholding certain arguments, then, upon 
losing the arbitration, raise such arguments in federal court. We will not tolerate 
such sandbagging.”). 
 56. E.g., Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. v. Saint Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 
668 F.3d 60, 75 (2d Cir. 2012) (encouraging focus on “how strongly th[e] 
relationship tends to indicate the possibility of bias in favor of or against one 
party, and not on how closely that relationship appears to relate to the facts of 
the arbitration”). 
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Courts attempting to balance these goals,57 with the confused 
guidance of Commonwealth Coatings as their lodestar, have struck the 
balance in different ways.  Some emphasize keeping arbitrators 
honest through searching judicial inquiry into the sufficiency of 
disclosures, and a rule requiring arbitrators to err on the side of 
disclosure.58  Others emphasize preserving finality, recognizing that 
the losing party has different incentives than prior to the arbitration 
and will often seize on facts or potential conflicts that seemed (or 
would have seemed) insignificant pre-arbitration in hopes of 
overturning the award.59  There is some agreement at the core, but at 
the margins (and they are fairly wide margins), courts disagree. 
The result is that the doctrine of evident partiality is inconsistent 
and divided by multiple splits among courts, which the Supreme 
Court has not yet resolved or granted certiorari to resolve.  The 
federal circuits have an acknowledged split over how to phrase the 
basic evident-partiality test, specifically a disagreement about whether 
evident partiality requires a mere appearance of bias or a more 
robust reasonableness standard.60  They also vary on both sides of the 
                                                          
 57. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. TUCO Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 632–37 (Tex. 
1997) (undertaking a broad survey of cases concerning arbitrators’ duty to 
disclose and noting that “the competing goals of expertise and impartiality must 
be balanced”). 
 58. See, e.g., New Regency Prods., Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, Inc., 501 F.3d 
1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting favorably Justice White’s concurrence in 
Commonwealth Coatings encouraging arbitrators to err on the side of disclosure); U.S. 
Wrestling Fed’n v. Wrestling Div. of AAU, Inc., 605 F.2d 313, 319 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(same); see also Stephen K. Huber, The Arbitration Jurisprudence of the Fifth Circuit:  
Round IV, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 463, 487 (2007) (“Disclosure solves the problem of 
the incentive for losing parties to engage in 20-20 hindsight after an arbitration 
award by investigating arbitrators’ backgrounds to uncover evidence of conflicts 
of interest.”). 
 59. See, e.g., Hobet Mining, Inc. v. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers, 877 F. 
Supp. 1011, 1019 (S.D.W. Va. 1994) (characterizing a post-award challenge as an 
“inappropriate attempt to seek a ‘second bite at the apple’ because of dissatisfaction 
with the outcome”); Daiichi Haw. Real Estate Corp. v. Lichter, 82 P.3d 411, 434 
(Haw. 2003) (refusing to endorse a “wait and see” approach to challenging the 
arbitration decision). 
 60. Compare Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 1994) (requiring only 
a mere appearance of bias for vacatur of award), and Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1204 (11th Cir. 1982) (same), with Health Servs Mgmt. Corp. 
v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1264 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 
750 F.2d 171, 173 (2d Cir. 1984)) (requiring more than a mere appearance of bias 
for vacatur of award), Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1358 (6th Cir. 
1989) (same), and Woods v. Saturn Distrib. Corp., 78 F.3d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(describing the standard as “[a] reasonable impression of bias”).  See generally Olson 
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 51 F.3d 157, 159 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(noting, understatedly, that “there is some uncertainty among the courts of appeals 
about the holding of Commonwealth Coatings”); Rossein & Hope, supra note 44, at 
212–13 (noting the federal circuit split between “appearance or impression of bias” 
and “a more narrow reasonableness standard, requiring ‘more than a mere 
appearance of bias’”). 
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split in how they apply the standard.61  State courts similarly differ 
with one another, and with federal courts (including sometimes 
federal courts in the state’s own circuit), about what is necessary to 
show evident partiality.62 
Beyond the basic disagreement over how to phrase the standard, 
numerous other points of disagreement or confusion infect evident-
partiality doctrine.  Courts disagree about whether an evident-
partiality challenge can be sustained based on facts not known by the 
arbitrator, and correspondingly whether arbitrators have any duty to 
search for unknown conflicts such that an award can be vacated if 
they fail to discover one.63  Courts disagree about whether there is 
independent significance to facts indicating that an arbitrator 
intended to mislead through her disclosures.64  They disagree 
whether the fact of nondisclosure itself suffices to establish evident 
partiality without reference to the materiality of the information.65  
                                                          
61. Compare Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 253 (3d Cir. 
2013) (defining evident partiality as a situation in which a reasonable person “would 
have to conclude” that an arbitrator was partial to one party to an arbitration), CI 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Electrical Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42, 51 (1st 
Cir. 2003) (same), and Morelite Constr. Corp v. N.Y. City Dist. Council Carpenters 
Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984) (same), with Positive Software 
Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 283 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(advocating a “reasonable impression of bias” standard that is “interpreted practically 
rather than with utmost rigor”), Dow Corning Corp. v. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 335 
F.3d 742, 750 (8th Cir. 2003) (defining evident partiality as a situation where a 
reasonable person “could assume” that the arbitrator had improper motives (quoting 
ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 501 (4th Cir. 1999))), and 
Univ. Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal Constructors Inc., 304 F.3d 1331, 1339 
(11th Cir. 2002) (defining evident partiality as information which “would lead” a 
reasonable person to believe that a potential conflict exists). 
 62. See, e.g., Amoco D.T. Co. v. Occidental Petrol. Corp., 343 S.W.3d 837, 842–44 
(Tex. App. 2011) (explicitly rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of “evident 
partiality” in Positive Software Solutions in favor of the Texas Supreme Court’s 
interpretation in TUCO). 
 63. Compare Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1049 (holding that an award may be vacated for 
nondisclosure if those facts create a “reasonable impression of partiality” even where 
such facts are unknown to the arbitrator), with Al-Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85 F.3d 
680, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[W]e explicitly hold that there is no duty on an arbitrator 
to make any such investigation.”), and Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM 
Investor Servs., Inc., 146 F.3d 1309, 1312–13 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that there is 
no independent duty to investigate under the FAA where the arbitrator is unaware of 
the undisclosed facts). 
 64. Compare Craig v. Barber, 524 So. 2d 974, 978 (Miss. 1988) (“Evident partiality 
has objective and subjective components.”), with Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. 
Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that 
“subjective good faith is not the test”). 
 65. Compare Burlington N. R.R. v. TUCO Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex. 1997) 
(“We emphasize that this evident partiality is established from the nondisclosure itself, 
regardless of whether the nondisclosed information necessarily establishes partiality 
or bias.”), with Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. v. Saint Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 
668 F.3d 60, 77 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The nondisclosure does not by itself constitute 
evident partiality.”). 
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They also disagree about what kind of relationship between arbitrator 
and party or counsel is sufficiently material or significant to show 
evident partiality.66 
In addition to the primary uncertainty over what the evident-
partiality standard should be, there is also significant uncertainty 
about the ancillary doctrine of constructive waiver.  That is, they 
disagree about how much knowledge is sufficient to put a party “on 
notice” of a relationship such that any post-award evident partiality 
objection based on that relationship will be constructively waived.67  
Courts generally agree that a party can waive an evident-partiality 
objection by failing to object to a conflict that the arbitrator 
disclosed, but they differ widely as to what counts as “knowing” about 
the relationship.  They take different positions about how much 
information a party must have about a potential conflict before it will 
constructively waive judicial challenge based on that conflict by 
proceeding with the arbitration without objecting.68  This means that 
after the arbitration, a winning party may face a challenge based on a 
relationship that was in some way disclosed before the arbitration.  
The winning party may then have to defend against arguments that the 
arbitrator failed to disclose sufficient details about the relationship to 
apprise the losing party of its significance or materiality.69 
                                                          
 66. See Lee Korland, Comment, What An Arbitrator Should Investigate and Disclose:  
Proposing a New Test for Evident Partiality Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 53 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 815, 826–27 (2003) (noting that “courts have also struggled to generate 
guidelines for determining what types of relationships and how proximate 
connections must be to warrant vacating an arbitration award”). 
 67. See, e.g., Fid. Fed. Bank, FSB v. Durga Ma Corp., 386 F.3d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir. 
2004) (holding that the waiver doctrine applies where a party has constructive 
knowledge of a potential conflict, yet fails to object prior to the arbitration decision). 
 68. Compare Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1359 (6th Cir. 1989) 
(holding that the successful party may not rely on the failure to object for bias unless 
“[a]ll the facts now argued as to [the] alleged bias were known . . . at the time the 
joint committee heard their grievances” (alterations in original) (quoting Early v. E. 
Transfer, 699 F.2d 552, 558 (1st Cir. 1983))), with JCI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of 
Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that a party “which 
was put on notice of the risk when it signed the contract [and] chose not to inquire 
about the backgrounds of the Committee members either before or during the 
hearing” waived the right to challenge the decision based on evident partiality), and 
Kiernan v. Piper Jaffray Cos., Inc., 137 F.3d 588, 593 (8th Cir. 1998) (“While they did 
not have full knowledge of all the relationships to which they now object, they did 
have concerns about [the arbitrator’s] impartiality and yet chose to have her 
remain on the panel rather than spend time and money investigating further until 
losing the arbitration.”). 
 69. See, e.g., Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC v. Tenaska Energy, Inc., 376 S.W.3d 
358, 362–63 (Tex. App. 2012) (considering a losing party’s challenge to the 
sufficiency of the details of the relationships the arbitrator disclosed); Applied Indus. 
Materials Corp. v. Ovular Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 
2007) (same); ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 
1999) (same). 
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Given the longstanding, wide-ranging, and intractable judicial 
division over evident-partiality doctrine, scholars have also weighed 
in, cataloging these divisions and attempting to resolve them by 
rationalizing or reforming the doctrine.70  Proposals have included a 
reasonableness standard requiring more than a mere appearance of 
bias,71 a standard requiring disclosure of “any facts that would lead a 
person to entertain a reasonable doubt of the arbitrator’s 
neutrality,”72 and a complete restructuring of the doctrine to 
abandon “value-laden, yet indeterminate terms such as ‘impartial’ or 
‘independent.’”73  None of these proposals, however, has carried the 
day in the courts, and so the meaning of evident partiality remains in 
judicial and theoretical disarray.74  While there have been efforts to 
convince the U.S. Supreme Court to take up a case to resolve these 
confusions,75 the Court has so far declined. 
                                                          
 70. See, e.g., David J. Branson, American Party-Appointed Arbitrators—Not the Three 
Monkeys, 30 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1 (2004) (suggesting a balance between the 
international arbitration model of appointing “sympathetic” arbitrators and the 
American arbitration model of appointing “partisan” arbitrators); Glick, supra note 
24, at 100 (proposing the adoption of a “basic standard of pre-arbitration disclosure” 
modeled after the ABA/AAA code of ethics); David Allen Larson, Conflicts of Interest 
and Disclosures:  Are We Making a Mountain Out of a Molehill?, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 879 
(2008) (analyzing how Federal Arbitration Act standards can be applied when a 
neutral arbitrator fails to make an adequate disclosure of evident partiality); David J. 
McLean & Sean-Patrick Wilson, Is Three a Crowd?  Neutrality, Partiality and Partisanship 
in the Context of Tripartite Arbitrations, 9 PEPP. DISP. RESOL L.J. 167, 176–77 (2008) 
(addressing factors parties should consider when examining the role of neutral and 
party-appointed arbitrators); Rogers, supra note 31 (suggesting that current 
standards governing arbitrator conduct are insufficient and arbitral institutions 
should adopt and enforce a code of ethics against arbitrators); Rossein & Hope, 
supra note 44 (advocating a shift from onerous disclosure requirements to a 
reasonableness standard for disclosure); Kirill Kan, Note, The Importance of FINRA’s 
Arbitrator Selection Process and Clarity in the “Evident Partiality” Standard in the Wake of 
Morgan Keegan, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 167 (2012) (suggesting mechanisms 
such as a screening process that FINRA could implement to eliminate arbitrators 
who have presided over similar product or firm cases); Korland, supra note 66 
(proposing that a party able to demonstrate that an arbitrator “made a reasonable 
investigation of potential conflicts” would have an affirmative defense to preserve an 
arbitral award); Kathryn A. Windsor, Comment, Defining Arbitrator Evident Partiality:  
The Catch-22 of Commercial Litigation Disputes, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 191 (2009) 
(indicating that an arbitrator should have an affirmative duty to investigate any 
potential conflicts before the arbitration to avoid lengthy processes to examining the 
adequacy of the disclosure).  
 71. Rossein & Hope, supra note 44, at 253–55. 
 72. Glick, supra note 24, at 101. 
 73. Rogers, supra note 31, at 81. 
 74. See, e.g., McLean & Wilson, supra note 70, at 176–77 (“Much to the frustration 
of arbitrators and practitioners everywhere, the vague ‘impression of possible bias’ 
test that the Court adopted in Commonwealth Coatings has been found difficult to 
define in practice.”). 
 75. E.g., Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 F.3d 
278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1114 (2007). 
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In short, evident-partiality doctrine is quite confused, as courts and 
scholars acknowledge.76  As a result, a party preparing to arbitrate 
faces serious uncertainty about how courts might resolve an evident-
partiality challenge to the arbitral award, with the outcome of the 
challenge depending heavily on the jurisdiction where it is heard, as 
well as on the competence of the trial court in understanding and 
applying the confused body of evident-partiality law.77 
2. Increased pressure on fractured evident-partiality doctrine 
While evident-partiality doctrine has long been divided, the 
narrowing or elimination of alternative avenues to challenge arbitral 
awards has placed increased pressure on the fractures in the doctrine.  
As alternative avenues narrow or disappear, losing parties increasingly 
focus on evident partiality (and its uncertainty) as their best hope for 
challenging undesired results.78 
                                                          
 76. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 251–54 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (noting the “confusion” stemming from the Commonwealth Coatings 
decision and choosing to follow a line of cases applying a “reasonable person” 
standard); Montez v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 260 F.3d 980, 983 (8th Cir. 2001) (“The 
absence of a consensus on the meaning of evident partiality is evidenced by the 
approaches adopted by the different circuits.”). 
 77. Some of this uncertainty might be reduced by the inclusion of venue 
provisions in parties’ arbitration agreements that specify a court or jurisdiction in 
which any challenge to an arbitral award must be heard.  Not all (or even most) 
agreements have venue provisions.  Without a venue provision, confirmation/vacatur 
proceedings can be brought anywhere venue is otherwise proper under the federal 
rules.  Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193, 199–200, 
202–04 (2000) (holding that the FAA’s venue provisions are permissive; therefore, a 
subsequent motion can be brought in the district where award was given or in any 
district according to the federal venue state).  Thus, prearbitration, parties cannot 
know which federal court, in what circuit, with which evident-partiality standard, will 
adjudicate award confirmation.  Furthermore, in many situations, 
confirmation/vacatur proceedings can be brought in state court with no possibility 
of removal.  See, e.g., Virgin Islands Hous. Auth. v. Coastal Gen. Constr. Servs. Corp., 
27 F.3d 911, 915 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Arbitration Act does not supply federal 
jurisdiction where it does not otherwise exist.”); Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense 
of Southland:  Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 101, 169 (2002) (“[W]hile the ‘primary purpose’ of the FAA was to 
make arbitration agreements enforceable in federal court, a secondary purpose was 
to make arbitration agreements enforceable in state court.”).  Thus, parties also face 
uncertainty about the version of the evident-partiality standard that will be applied to 
their award when state and federal courts in a single state apply different versions of 
the evident-partiality doctrine.  Compare Positive Software Solutions, 476 F.3d at 283 
(adopting more lenient standard that overlooks “a trivial or insubstantial prior 
relationship” and interprets the “‘reasonable impression of bias’ standard . . . 
practically rather than with utmost rigor”), with Burlington N. R.R. v. TUCO Inc., 960 
S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex. 1997) (adopting a stricter standard that allows evident 
partiality to be established “from the nondisclosure itself, regardless of whether the 
nondisclosed information necessarily establishes partiality”). 
 78. See, e.g., Will Pryor, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 65 SMU L. REV. 247, 252 
(2012) (noting evident partiality-based motions to vacate arbitration awards have 
been rising in recent years); see also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability 
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Courts, led by the U.S. Supreme Court, have steadily reduced other 
avenues to challenge arbitral awards.79  Most notably, the Supreme 
Court recently cast severe doubt on, and nearly eliminated, the 
judicially-crafted doctrine allowing vacatur of an award based on the 
“manifest disregard” of facts or law by the arbitral panel.80  Manifest 
disregard allowed overturning arbitration decisions on substantive 
grounds, though the standard was high.81  But, in Hall Street 
Associates v. Mattel,82 the Court held that parties may not 
contractually agree to expand the judicial scope of review of 
arbitration awards beyond that provided in the FAA.83  In doing 
so, the opinion casts serious doubt on the viability of the 
judicially-crafted “manifest disregard” ground for challenging an 
arbitral award.84 
                                                          
Game:  Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1420, 1422 (2008) (“Because the Supreme Court has embraced arbitration much 
more firmly than have some other parts of the judicial system, there is a sort of 
hydraulic pressure in the system that will seek release through whatever channel still 
exists for invalidating, or at least limiting, arbitration agreements.”). 
 79. See, e.g., Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008) (contracting 
the manifest disregard doctrine as grounds for vacatur); Taylor v. Univ. of 
Phoenix/Apollo Grp., 487 F. App’x 942 (5th Cir. 2012) (requiring a nexus between 
the alleged fraud and the arbitrator’s decisionnot just the existence of fraudto 
justify vacatur under the FAA); Lessin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
481 F.3d 813, 819–20 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (requiring that the objecting party show it was 
deprived of a fundamentally fair hearing for vacatur under the FAA).  The decisions 
narrowing avenues to challenge arbitral awards are part of a broader trend led by the 
Supreme Court to restrict attempts to escape or avoid arbitration.  See, e.g., Am. 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (enforcing class-arbitration 
waiver); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (same); see also 
Hal S. Scott & Leslie N. Silverman, Stockholder Adoption of Mandatory Individual 
Arbitration for Stockholder Disputes, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1187, 1222 (2013) 
(highlighting the current Supreme Court’s “consistent decisions in favor of the 
FAA’s broad pro-arbitration policy”). 
 80. Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584–85 (2008). 
 81. See e.g., Kurke v. Oscar Gruss and Son, Inc., 454 F.3d 350, 354 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (emphasizing that manifest disregard is a demanding standard requiring proof 
that arbitrators blatantly disregarded facts or law applicable to the case); Stark v. 
Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., 381 F.3d 793, 799, 802 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(same); Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003) (same); Bowen v. 
Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 932 (10th Cir. 2001) (same). 
 82. 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
 83. Id. at 586. 
 84. See, e.g., MyLinda K. Sims & Richard A. Bales, Much Ado About Nothing:  The 
Future of Manifest Disregard After Hall Street, 62 S.C. L. REV. 407, 424–33 (2010) 
(describing the circuit split concerning whether manifest disregard lives after Hall 
Street and suggesting that even though the doctrine survives, it remains unworkable 
and should be replaced); Karen A. Lorang, Comment, Mitigating Arbitration’s 
Externalities:  A Call for Tailored Judicial Review, 59 UCLA L. REV. 218, 228–29 (2011) 
(“The Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have read Hall Street to completely 
eliminate judicially created grounds for vacatur, including manifest disregard. In 
contrast, the Second, Seventh, and Ninth (and perhaps the Tenth) Circuits have 
held that the doctrine survives.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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In addition to the decline of manifest disregard, other decisions 
have tightened statutory avenues for vacatur other than evident 
partiality.85  Disappointed losing parties are left with fewer options, 
and in many jurisdictions, no options at all, to challenge awards 
based on substantive disagreement with the decision.86  At the same 
time, evident-partiality doctrine has not yet been subjected to this 
same sort of clarification and constriction by the Supreme Court, and 
instead is in great disarray.87  These pressures appear to be resulting 
in an increasing number of evident partiality challenges in court.88 
Because of the reduction in other avenues to challenge arbitral 
awards, and the uncertainty about the content and application of the 
doctrine of evident partiality, losing parties have a strong incentive to 
raise evident-partiality challenges to awards in hopes of uncovering 
undisclosed relationships or additional facts about disclosed 
                                                          
 85. See, e.g., Stanley A. Leasure, Vacatur of Arbitration Awards:  The Poor Loser 
Problem or Loser Pays?, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 489, 506–09 (2007) (discussing 
the available grounds for vacatur under the FAA, and noting that “federal courts 
have taken a narrow view in interpreting ‘undue means,’” “most courts have been 
reluctant to vacate an arbitration award on the statutory basis of fraud,” and that 
vacatur due to arbitrator misconduct is typically only possible upon clear proof of 
“bad faith or gross error”); see also Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur 
After Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1103, 1108–16 (2009) (detailing the increasing 
difficulty of successfully vacating an award under statutory and non-statutory grounds 
for vacatur). 
 86. The trend towards limiting ways to challenge arbitral awards has become 
more common:  courts have slowly eliminated or narrowed doctrines that held that 
parties could not waive access to a judicial forum to pursue certain types of claims.  
See, e.g., Bruhl, supra note 78, at 1431–32 (tracing expansion of arbitration to include 
statutory causes of action).  Together, these trends comprise a broader movement of 
increasing judicial friendliness towards arbitration, or sweeping more claims into 
arbitration and reducing ways to challenge the results); David Horton, Arbitration and 
Inalienability:  A Critique of the Vindication of Rights Doctrine, 60 KAN. L. REV. 723, 724–25 
(2012) (explaining and critiquing the increased burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate 
that “they cannot vindicate their federal statutory rights in arbitration” before 
seeking judicial review); see also, Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (reading the FAA, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, to 
embody “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any 
state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary”); Bruhl, supra note 78, at 
1426–29 (describing the Supreme Court’s transformation of the FAA into “the 
broadly sweeping, muscular statute we know today”); Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme 
Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, 63 CASE W. L. REV. 91, 93–94 
(2012) (discussing the judiciary’s shift from hostility to arbitration towards a “judicial 
policy favoring arbitration”). 
 87. See supra Part I.B. 
 88. Westlaw searches for all cases mentioning the phrase “evident partiality (a 
crude way to measure how often the issue is litigated) turn up 3,517 cases overall. Of 
these, 1,371 were in the 2000s, as compared to 736 in the 1990s and 398 in the 
1980s—roughly doubling every decade.  Moreover, the trend seems to be 
accelerating:  in the three years from 2010-2013, there were 604 such cases, which is 
on pace to reach over 2000 cases by the conclusion of the decade. 
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relationships.89  Winning parties face the prospect of litigation to 
preserve the award that will be costly and protracted at best.90  At 
worst, an evident-partiality challenge may result in invalidation of the 
award, even in circumstances where many other courts would have 
confirmed it.  Losing parties face the long-shot prospect of spending 
a great deal of time and money to try to escape an award.  Moreover, 
arbitrators face the prospect of time-consuming and unpleasant 
investigations into their dealings and background, which may have a 
broader chilling effect on arbitrators’ willingness to serve.91  Further, 
this effect will be most pronounced for arbitrators with the most 
expertise in the area of the dispute, because these arbitrators will be 
more likely to have material connections in the area or industry.  This 
means that the “best” (defined as most experienced) arbitrators will 
be the ones most dissuaded from serving.92 
In short, the uncertainty and division over evident partiality 
presents a serious practical problem for parties to arbitrations and for 
arbitrators.  Courts and scholars have recognized this confusion, but 
they have yet to provide a satisfying and reassuring resolution.93  
Instead of offering another attempt to rationalize or conform the 
evident-partiality doctrine, this Article suggests an alternative 
approach that should have great practical attractiveness to parties 
and does have sound theoretical justifications.  Parties can make 
                                                          
 89. See Pryor, supra note 78, at 252 (noting that challenging the adequacy of 
arbitrator disclosures is the most popular means for challenging arbitrator partiality). 
 90. See, e.g., Eric J. Mogilnicki & Kirk D. Jensen, Arbitration and Unconscionability, 
19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 761, 780–81 (2003) (“Because the FAA specifically allows federal 
court challenges to arbitration awards where the arbitrator was not impartial, any 
actual or apparent bias leads to costly litigation—the very result both parties are 
seeking to avoid. An arbitration award tainted by evident partiality will be overturned 
in post-award litigation, further increasing dispute resolution costs to the parties.” 
(footnote omitted)).  Costs can include litigation and discovery in the trial court 
as well as one or more rounds of appellate litigation to overturn the initial 
judicial ruling. 
 91. See, e.g., Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 
F.3d 278, 285–86 (5th Cir. 2007) (concluding that holding arbitrators to a “higher 
ethical standard than federal Article III judges” would deter the “best lawyers and 
professionals” from serving as arbitrators, thus eliminating the expertise demanded 
in arbitrations). 
 92. Id. at 285–86 (“Arbitration would lose the benefit of specialized knowledge, 
because the best lawyers and professionals, who normally have the longest lists of 
potential connections to disclose, have no need to risk blemishes on their 
reputations from post-arbitration lawsuits attacking them as biased.”). 
 93. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 251 (3d Cir. 
2013) (stating that “[t]he first order of business is to define ‘evident partiality’ under 
the Federal Arbitration Act” which is plagued with “confusion”); Edward Brunet, 
Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 97–98 (1992) (“The 
Commonwealth Coatings decision is confusing. . . .  Lower courts have struggled 
with the ‘less than clear [evident partiality] standard’ of Commonwealth Coatings.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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express waivers of evident-partiality objections before arbitration 
begins, which courts can and should enforce, to cut off evident-
partiality objections in ensuing litigation to confirm the award.  In 
the next part, I explain how express waivers of evident-partiality 
objections would work, and argue for their practical advantages and 
theoretical justifications. 
II. EXPRESS WAIVERS OF EVIDENT-PARTIALITY CHALLENGES 
A. Proposal and Procedure for Express Prearbitration Waivers of Evident-
Partiality Challenges 
The basic idea is straightforward:  after the arbitrators have made 
disclosures, and the parties have been given the opportunity to ask 
follow-up questions,94 the parties can agree to an express, binding 
waiver of evident-partiality challenges in any ensuing judicial 
proceeding to confirm or vacate the award.95  The details of the 
                                                          
 94. See, e.g., Stone v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 872 F. Supp. 2d 435, 440–41 (E.D. Pa. 
2012) (finding that FINRA instructed its arbitrator to “disclose [a] potential conflict 
as broadly as you can and then invite . . . questions” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); McKinney Drilling Co. v. Mach I Ltd. P’ship, 359 A.2d 100, 102 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1976) (evaluating a party’s objection to an AAA arbitrator, the AAA’s 
subsequent decision to overrule the objection, and the party’s request for and the 
court’s granting of an order permitting the parties to ask questions of the arbitrator 
concerning a prior relationship); Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC v. Tenaska Energy, 
Inc., 376 S.W.3d 358, 372 (Tex. App. 2012) (holding that “a few basic and obvious 
questions posed to [the arbitrator] when the disclosure was received would have 
adduced the very information that they are now complaining about”). 
 95. The express-waiver idea is not analyzed at any length in either academic 
literature or case law.  The idea of a waiver is mentioned in one article 
recommending new guidelines for arbitrator disclosures, but the focus in that article 
(as in other articles) is on rethinking or adjusting the disclosure standard. Glick, 
supra note 24, at 101 (“If these disclosures are made at the time of appointment, 
parties may waive objections to the appearance of bias, request more 
information, . . . or challenge the arbitrator for cause.  This should eliminate many 
post-arbitration challenges for arbitrator nondisclosure.”).  Another article addresses 
and endorses the idea of parties agreeing to limit judicial review and notes 
specifically that such “exclusion agreements” are enforceable under British law, but 
that “this trend is yet to cross the Atlantic into the United States.”  Kenneth M. 
Curtin, An Examination of Contractual Expansion and Limitation of Judicial Review of 
Arbitral Awards, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RES. 337, 357–60 (2000).  There is also some 
indication in court decisions that arbitral panels are attempting to use such waivers 
in practice, but there are no decisions specifically analyzing the enforceability of such 
a waiver.  See, e.g., Ponderosa Pine Energy, 376 S.W.3d at 362 (“Additionally, at the 
urging of [arbitrator] Justice Baker, the order contained a waiver of conflicts 
provision in which the parties and the arbitrators confirmed that they . . . knowingly 
waive any and all conflicts of interest and/or potential conflicts of interest . . . .”); see 
also Cozzolino v. Cozzolino, No. L-10417-10, 2012 WL 6097090, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. Dec. 10, 2012) (holding that the parties’ signature to “the pre-hearing 
arbitration order, which stated that ‘[t]he parties waive any and all rights of appeal 
or to in any way challenge the Arbitrator’s decision, which shall be conclusive and final in 
all respect[s]” constituted a waiver of appeal (alterations in original) (emphasis 
added)).  Nor are there any judicial decisions specifically considering the 
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waiver and waiver process may vary based on the procedures the 
parties have agreed to (in an ad hoc arbitration), or on the governing 
arbitral rules.  The basic proposal is that arbitrators and parties can 
and should use express waivers to cut off some or all judicial evident-
partiality challenges. 
Procedurally, the waiver process would take place at the conclusion 
of the arbitral disclosure process, but before the beginning of the 
hearing.96  The waiver could take several forms.  The parties 
themselves could each sign a joint filing indicating that they waive 
any evident-partiality objection.  Or, the arbitrators might issue a 
prehearing order declaring that the parties have confirmed they have 
no objections based on evident partiality, and have the parties sign 
this order to demonstrate their consent to the waiver.97  In a “live” 
arbitration, the arbitrators might simply ask the parties on the record 
whether they agree to waive any objections based on evident 
partiality, and secure verbal responses for the transcript. 
In general, implementing the waiver through the parties’ express 
written consent is more desirable because it more firmly grounds the 
waiver (like the arbitration itself) in the mutual written agreement 
(contract) of the parties.98  Although the formality of the waiver 
perhaps should not matter,99 a court might well disagree.  Instead, a 
court may be more likely to enforce a signed party waiver as opposed 
to a mere verbal indication in the transcript of proceedings before 
                                                          
enforceability of such a waiver in the evident-partiality context.  But see 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 14 F.3d 818, 822–23 (2d Cir. 
1994) (upholding arbitral clause that limited judicial review to an “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard). 
 96. See Rossein and Hope, supra note 44, at 204–06 (explaining arbitrators’ 
disclosure obligations and how the arbitration disclosure process works). 
 97. See, e.g., Cozzolino, 2012 WL 6097090, at *6 (upholding a prehearing 
arbitration order drafted by the plaintiff’s attorney stating that the parties waive their 
rights to appeal or challenge the arbitrator’s decision).  The arbitrators probably 
could not and should not simply issue an order stating that evident-partiality 
challenges will be waived because parties have not raised any objections.  Such a 
waiver would likely be unenforceable because it would be untethered from the 
principle of party consent that is the root of the theoretical justification for enforcing 
express waivers, as well as the theoretical justification for binding arbitration in 
general.  Instead, the case would likely be analyzed as a constructive-waiver case, 
which is exactly what the express-waiver proposal seeks to give parties a way to avoid.  
See ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 496–502 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(ignoring institutional arbitrator’s pre-arbitration opinion that an evident-
partiality challenge to a particular, disclosed relationship would be waived); see 
also infra Part II.C. 
 98. See infra Part III.C (discussing the importance of the parties’ consent in 
providing the theoretical justification for enforcing the waiver).  
 99. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) (“[T]he 
informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing the cost and 
increasing the speed of dispute resolution.”). 
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the panel, or (especially) a unilateral statement by the arbitrator(s) 
that the parties agreed to a waiver.100  In particular, since the 
jurisprudence upholding arbitration agreements focuses not just on 
the parties’ consent, but on the parties’ contract,101 the more the 
waiver looks like a contract, the likelier it is that courts would be 
untroubled about enforcing it. 102 
As to the scope of the waiver, it could take narrower or broader 
forms.  Parties could narrowly agree to waive an evident-partiality 
objection only as to relationships revealed in the arbitrator’s 
disclosures.103  Alternatively, parties could broadly agree to waive all 
evident-partiality objections, including any based on relationships 
completely undisclosed by the arbitrator.  While both forms of waiver 
might be enforceable, the narrower form will likely be more attractive 
to parties, and more likely to be enforced by courts.  It is less likely 
and more problematic that parties would want to forego evident-
partiality objections based on relationships that the arbitrator entirely 
failed to disclose, or especially actively concealed.104  Further, courts 
would likely be more reluctant to enforce such a waiver, even if the 
parties’ consent was plain, when a party was entirely unaware of a 
potentially relevant relationship.  This Article therefore focuses 
primarily on the practical attractions and theoretical justifications for 
this narrower form of waiver.105 
                                                          
 100. See, e.g., ANR Coal Co., 173 F.3d at 496–502 (analyzing waiver based on 
constructive waiver doctrine when there was not a signed party writing confirming 
the waiver). 
 101. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 
570 (1960) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that “arbitration is a creature of 
contract”); infra Part III.C (discussing the Supreme Court’s recent arbitration 
jurisprudence and its emphasis on enforcing the parties’ contract). 
 102. While it would be necessary to secure the parties’ express consent to the 
waiver, arbitrators might persuade the parties to agree to the waiver by asking the 
parties to either raise a challenge or agree to a waiver before the arbitration can 
proceed.  Indeed, it is the arbitrator’s duty to “conduct the arbitration process so as 
to advance the fair and efficient resolution of the matters submitted for decision.”  
THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES Canon I(F).  Of 
course, “an arbitrator should not exert pressure on any party to settle or to utilize 
other dispute resolution processes.” Id. at Canon IV(F).  However, the Code of Ethics 
explicitly provides “it is not improper for an arbitrator to suggest . . . other dispute 
resolution processes.”  Id.  While caution would be necessary, arbitrators could at 
least encourage parties to agree to waive partiality objections. 
 103. See infra Part III.D (addressing the argument that this narrow type of waiver 
would not do much to reduce collateral evident-partiality litigation). 
 104. See id. (considering the implications and analysis of a broader, blanket waiver of 
evident-partiality challenges, and recommending against such an approach). 
 105. See id. (discussing the potential for flexibility in the scope of the waiver, based 
on the parties’ mutual agreement). 
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B. Express Waivers of Evident-Partiality Challenges Will Be of Great 
Practical Use and Attractiveness to Parties to Arbitrations. 
Express waivers of evident-partiality challenges based on 
relationships somehow disclosed (i.e., “narrow” waivers) would have 
significant usefulness and value to parties.  They would eliminate 
challenges to a relationship disclosed by the arbitrator based on 
arguments that the arbitrator failed to provide enough details of the 
relationship or sufficiently disclose facts indicating its materiality.106  
It would require parties to speak up or hold their peace—i.e., object, 
or waive— as to any problems they have with relationships that have 
been disclosed by the arbitrator, balancing their desire to complete 
arbitration and the general perceived desirability of the panel against 
any concerns they might have based on the disclosures.  It would 
foreclose collateral litigation during the award-confirmation process 
over whether the objecting party constructively waived the objection, 
and dispel uncertainty due to courts’ division over what constitutes a 
constructive waiver.107  Instead, the reviewing court could simply 
review the arbitrator’s disclosure and the express waiver, and if the 
relationship that is the basis of the evident partiality challenge is one 
that was present in the arbitrator’s disclosure, it can reject the 
evident-partiality challenge without more inquiry.  Instead of being 
adrift in the “murky waters” of evident-partiality doctrine,108 parties 
will be in the clear safe harbor of mutual waiver.109 
                                                          
 106. These sorts of challenges are a fairly common type of evident-partiality 
litigation.  See, e.g., Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC v. Tenaska Energy, Inc., 376 S.W.3d 
358, 361 (Tex. App. 2012) (losing party challenged the sufficiency of the arbitrator’s 
disclosure of details about the challenged relationship); see also Applied Indus. 
Materials Corp. v. Ovular Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132, 136, 139 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (same); ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 496 (4th 
Cir. 1999) (same); Will Pryor, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 65 SMU L. REV. 247, 252 
(2012) (“The most popular means of proving evident partiality is to challenge the 
adequacy of the disclosures made by the arbitrator prior to confirmation.”). 
 107. See, e.g., Fid. Fed. Bank, FSB v. Durga Ma Corp., 386 F.3d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir. 
2004) (holding that the waiver doctrine applies where a party has constructive 
knowledge of a potential conflict, yet fails to object prior to the arbitration decision); 
JCI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 
2003) (concluding that a party waived its evident partiality complaint when it “was 
put on notice of the risk” when it signed a contract providing for an industry-
represented arbitration panel and “chose not to inquire about the backgrounds of 
the Committee members either before or during the hearing”); see also supra notes 
67–69 and accompanying text (examining courts’ divisions over the doctrine of 
constructive waiver). 
 108. Perlstadt, supra note 14, at 1997 (“In navigating these murky waters, several 
circuit courts have adopted a standard [of evident partiality] somewhere between an 
‘appearance of bias’ standard and the ‘actual bias’ standard . . . .”). 
 109. Of course, the parties after the fact will have very different degrees of 
happiness about being in that safe harbor, but this is a “feature, not a bug.”  See 
generally John A. Robertson, “Paying the Alligator”:  Precommitment in Law, Bioethics, and 
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An express waiver will allow the parties, ex ante, to greatly reduce 
the potential for costly and time-consuming post-award litigation 
before the award is finally confirmed.  Arbitrators can be reassured 
that if they mention a relationship in their disclosure, and truthfully 
answer any follow-up questions, they will not be subjected to a post-
award investigation designed to make them look at best professionally 
negligent and at worst dishonest and partial.110 
Further, there is actually a significant practical likelihood that 
parties would agree to such a waiver.  In general, before arbitration, 
the parties have significantly different incentives than afterwards, 
when the losing party will usually want to overturn the award by any 
means available.111  After a loss, facts or potential conflicts that were 
insignificant and untroubling before the arbitration began become 
reeds to clutch in hopes of overturning the award.112  Conversely, 
before an arbitration hearing, a party will have a much stronger 
incentive to forego post-award collateral challenges for the sake of 
efficiency, and for the sake of allowing the arbitration to proceed.113  
This is especially true as to disclosed relationships about which the 
party might not have all the details, but about which it feels relatively 
untroubled at the time the arbitration begins; that is, relationships 
covered by the narrower type of waiver mentioned above.114 
Thus, the waiver would operate to foreclose challenges in precisely 
the cases where cutting off challenges is most desirable.  In other 
words, a party will more likely agree to the waiver in cases when, ex 
ante, it has fewer “real” concerns about a relationship disclosed by 
the arbitrator before the arbitration.  Waivers will thus greatly reduce 
challenges that are manufactured after the arbitration by a party that 
                                                          
Constitutions, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1729, 1729–38 (2003) (analyzing the advantages and 
limits of precommitment behavior—whose “hallmark” is “the intention to restrict 
future options”—across a variety of legal disciplines); see also infra notes 115–118, 148 
and accompanying text. 
 110. See, e.g., Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 
F.3d 278, 285–86 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting the potential for chilling effects on 
arbitrators from routine judicial evident-partiality challenges).  
 111. See, e.g., Huber, supra note 59, at 487 (describing the ex post “incentive for 
losing parties to engage in 20-20 hindsight after an arbitration award by investigating 
arbitrators’ backgrounds to uncover evidence of conflicts of interest”). 
 112. See, e.g., Positive Software Solutions, 476 F.3d at 285 (“Just as happened here, 
losing parties would have an incentive to conduct intensive, after-the-fact 
investigations to discover the most trivial of relationships, most of which they likely 
would not have objected to if disclosure had been made.”). 
 113. See generally Reuben, supra note 15, at 962–64 (suggesting that arbitration’s 
strengths as a flexible, efficient alternative to dispute resolution focused on finality 
may contribute to arbitration’s drawbacks as a private process that leads parties to 
forego some “public law rights”). 
 114. See supra Part III.A.  
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is casting about for a way to escape an undesirable award.115  This 
solution will reduce, if not eliminate, the common practice of a 
party keeping an evident-partiality challenge in its back pocket for 
later judicial proceedings rather than raising or investigating it 
further before the arbitration begins.116  Conversely, a party with 
legitimate qualms about a disclosed relationship will be highly 
motivated to ask any follow-up questions it has before agreeing to a 
waiver, to find out whether there is anything to be truly concerned 
about before it proceeds. 
Thus, using narrow express waivers of evident-partiality challenges 
will be an effective way to cull the most undesirable and inefficient 
evident-partiality challenges from the judicial system.117  Parties will 
be spared having to await a court decision about whether the 
relationship was significant, whether additional details about the 
relationship were necessary to accurately convey its significance, 
whether it matters if the arbitrator knew all the details, and whether 
the relationship in all of its detail would create a mere appearance or 
a reasonable impression of bias.  These are all questions whose 
resolution would be uncertain because of the fractures and divisions 
of evident-partiality doctrine.118 
Further, parties may have other incentives to agree to such a 
waiver.  The arbitrators might make moving forward with the 
arbitration conditional on agreement to a waiver.  Parties would be 
placed under pressure to either agree to the waiver, ask any further 
questions about the arbitrator’s disclosures it desires, challenge the 
arbitrator (with the delay and risk119 that entails), or go through the 
trouble, time, and expense of finding a different panel.  Parties might 
                                                          
 115. See, e.g., Positive Software Solutions, 476 F.3d at 284–85 (holding that an 
undisclosed “slender connection” between the arbitrator and one of the parties in 
the case did not warrant dismissal of the award). 
 116. See, e.g., id.; Nat’l Wrecking Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 731, 990 F.2d 
957, 960 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Parties . . . cannot stand by during arbitration, withholding 
certain arguments, then, upon losing the arbitration, raise such arguments in federal 
court.  We will not tolerate such sandbagging.”). 
 117. See Positive Software Solutions, 476 F.3d at 285 (criticizing evident-partiality 
challenges in which the challenger likely would not have found the information 
objectionable if it had asked questions to elicit it). 
 118. See supra Part II.B (detailing the current judicial division on each of these points). 
 119. See ANR Coal Co., Inc. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 
1999) (noting party’s argument that it had declined to raise a challenge because “a 
failed challenge could potentially offend the ‘neutral’ arbitrator as a challenge to his 
integrity.”; see also John G. Keolit & John S. Jiernan, THE LITIGATION MANUAL:  
PRETRIAL 19 (ABA 1999) (“If you fail, after having challenged a judge on the basis of 
bias, the judge would indeed need to be a saint not to harbor some abiding ill 
will. . . .  [S]urely the recusal motion is a risky way of achieving an uncertain 
end.”); Omar Little, The Wire, Lessons (HBO 2002) (“You come at the king, you 
best not miss.”). 
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choose to agree to such a waiver as a precommitment strategy to 
signal to their opponent (or themselves) their confidence or 
seriousness about winning the arbitration.120 
In sum, the ex ante pressures, incentives, and circumstances parties 
face will often induce them to agree to a waiver, which is enforceable 
ex post after the losing party’s incentives have changed and the party 
looks for a way to escape the award.  The parties will thus be spared 
time and expense litigating evident partiality in an award-
confirmation proceeding.  In addition, courts will be spared having to 
preside over proceedings that amount to an extended postmortem 
on the arbitral disclosure process.121  At a minimum, courts may be 
able to dispose of these challenges more quickly, a goal that courts 
on different sides of the evident partiality division have proclaimed 
they share.122 
C. Enforcing Express Waivers Is Theoretically Consistent With Arbitration’s 
Fundamental Policies 
Express-partiality waivers are not only practically attractive, but 
there is a strong theoretical basis for courts enforcing them rooted in 
the underlying policies supporting arbitration itself.  The 
fundamental theoretical policy justification for arbitration is that it 
allows parties to consensually choose an alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism that is more efficient, flexible, and final than court 
proceedings.123  While the efficiency of arbitration is disputed,124 it is 
clear that the fundamental justification for enforcing arbitration 
agreements is that parties may choose arbitration for themselves 
based on that belief.125  At the most basic level, the essential 
                                                          
 120. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 109, at 1731 (“Cortés burned his boats in 
Mexico to prevent his or his soldiers own cowardice at the same time that he signaled 
to the Aztecs that his men would not back down.”). 
 121. Positive Software Solutions, 476 F.3d at 285. 
 122. Compare id. (justifying its approach to evident partiality on the grounds of not 
wanting to encourage judicial evident-partiality challenges), with Burlington N. R.R. 
v. TUCO Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 637 (Tex. 1997) (justifying its full-disclosure/err-
towards-disclosure approach on the grounds that it will keep courts from having to 
decide disclosure challenges).   
 123. E.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) (“The 
point of affording parties discretion in designing arbitration processes is to allow for 
efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute. . . .  And the 
informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing the cost and 
increasing the speed of dispute resolution.”). 
 124. See supra note 10 (contrasting the perceived benefits and perceived pitfalls of 
arbitration to show that there is a lack of consensus on arbitration’s appeal). 
 125. See, e.g., Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (“The overarching purpose of the 
FAA . . .is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their 
terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings”); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010) (“In bilateral arbitration, parties forgo the 
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justification for arbitration is consent—the parties’ agreement to 
resolve their disputes in an arbitral forum.126  The corollary of this 
policy is that, once the parties have chosen to arbitrate, they can and 
should be bound by that choice, and its accompanying consequence 
of foregoing the process and procedure of a judicial forum.127 
Further, as recent Supreme Court decisions have made clear, this 
principle of agreement/consent extends to the enforcement of party 
agreements about certain procedural rights or vehicles in the 
arbitration, most notably class arbitration.128  The Court has not 
addressed evident partiality since 1968, but it has been very active in 
resolving other arbitration-related issues, and the Roberts Court in 
particular has taken a strong interest in arbitration.129  Thus, it is 
worth looking to these decisions to see how they support the 
proposal to use express waivers to avoid protracted collateral 
evident-partiality litigation.130 
                                                          
procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts in order to realize the benefits of 
private dispute resolution:  lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability 
to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.”); Freyermuth, supra 
note 10, at 477 (“The most evident objective sought by parties in choosing 
arbitration is efficiency.”). 
 126. See e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 628 (1985) (upholding the Circuit Court’s decision that the parties were bound 
to their arbitration agreement because Congress did not “preclude a waiver of 
judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue”); Kendall Builders, Inc. v. Chesson, 
149 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. App. 2004) (“Arbitration is founded upon the consent of 
parties to forego their right to litigate disputes in our court system and instead 
submit them to a private decisionmaker.”). 
 127. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1773–74 (“Whether enforcing an agreement 
to arbitrate or construing an arbitration clause, courts and arbitrators must give 
effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties. . . .  In this 
endeavor, as with any other contract, the parties’ intentions control.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 128. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013) 
(enforcing class-arbitration waiver); Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748, 1752 (2011) 
(holding that class-wide arbitration contradicts the purposes of the FAA); Stolt-Nielsen, 
130 S. Ct. at 1775 (holding that a party may not be compelled to submit to class 
arbitration if there is no contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to 
do so). 
 129. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Tainted Love:  An Increasingly Odd Arbitral 
Infatuation in Derogation of Sound and Consistent Jurisprudence, 60 KAN. L. REV. 795, 796–
99 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s “love affair” with arbitration over the past 
three decades has led to a series of crucial decisions that began in 1983 and has 
accelerated under the Roberts Court). 
 130. The Roberts Court’s arbitration cases have been heavily criticized for 
misreading the FAA and creating unfairness for consumers.  See generally, e.g., George 
A. Bermann, Arbitration in the Roberts Supreme Court, 27 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 893 (2012) 
(criticizing the Roberts Court’s recent arbitration decisions as detrimental to 
consumers); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami:  ATT Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes 
Access To Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703 (2012) (describing how the Court’s Concepcion 
decision would “provide companies with free rein to commit fraud, torts, 
discrimination, and other harmful acts without fear of being sued”).  For a brief 
discussion of whether the use and enforcement of express waivers is undesirable in 
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While the consent principle has long been a bedrock of the 
modern Court’s arbitration jurisprudence,131 the Court’s recent 
decisions in cases addressing class arbitration have been particularly 
emphatic about grounding arbitration in the parties’ mutual consent, 
and binding the parties to the terms of their agreements.132  In that 
line of recent decisions, the Court has held that parties may not be 
forced to submit to class arbitration unless they agree to it,133 and that 
when they agree in the arbitration contract to forego class 
arbitration, they will be held to that agreement,134 but that when they 
agree to let the arbitrator decide whether the arbitration agreement 
allows class arbitration, they will be held to that agreement as well.135  
Taken together, then, these decisions confirm the Supreme Court’s 
guidance that the parties’ agreement controls—courts should 
enforce arbitral parties’ agreements about the procedures that will be 
used in the arbitration, including agreements to waive procedural 
rights,136 but parties must expressly agree to the use of a disputed 
procedural vehicle before they will be held to it.137  These decisions 
support this Article’s argument that courts should enforce parties’ 
agreements to use a waiver procedure and forego evident-partiality 
challenges, as well as this Article’s argument that express waivers are a 
better alternative to the currently more common constructive-waiver 
doctrine and analysis. 
While most of these decisions focus on the terms of the parties’ 
arbitration agreement itself,138 the important distinction for purposes 
of this Article is between the parties’ prior consent to terms 
                                                          
light of these broader critiques of the trend towards making arbitration harder to 
escape and awards harder to challenge, see infra Part III.E. 
 131. See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 
489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (“Arbitration under the [Federal Arbitration] Act is a 
matter of consent, not coercion . . . .”); but see Reuben supra note 15, at 1003–06 
(arguing that since arbitration is enabled by state action, it should be subject to 
due process constraints). 
 132. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1774–75 (“It falls to courts and arbitrators 
to give effect to these contractual limitations, and when doing so, courts and 
arbitrators must not lose sight of the purpose of the exercise:  to give effect to 
the intent of the parties.”). 
 133. Id. at 687 (2010).  
 134. Am Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013).  
 135. Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct. at 2071. 
 136. This would include both the right to class arbitration in Italian Colors 
Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. at 2309, and the right to object to the arbitrator’s 
determination that the contract allows class arbitration in Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2071.  
 137. Stolt-Nielsen, 588 U.S. at 684. 
 138. The exception is Oxford Health Plans, which enforced the parties’ agreement 
after arbitration had begun to let the arbitrator decide whether the arbitration 
contract allowed class arbitration.  133 S. Ct. at 2071.   
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governing the arbitration, and one party’s attempt to escape those 
terms after the fact.139  The Court’s recent decisions rejecting such 
attempts strongly support the idea that courts should similarly 
enforce the parties’ mutual consent, before the arbitration, to forego 
certain evident-partiality challenges in subsequent judicial 
proceedings to confirm the award.140 
Using and judicially enforcing express waivers of evident partiality 
objections to disclose relationships furthers these fundamental 
theoretical justifications and policy goals, as explained in the 
Supreme Court’s decisions.  Like arbitration itself, evident-partiality 
waivers are consent-based.  The parties can mutually agree to 
prospectively forego uncertain and expensive evident-partiality 
challenges, just as they can choose by their arbitration agreement to 
forego more elaborate judicial process, to adopt a particular arbitral 
rule set to govern their dispute, to exclude certain sorts of 
procedures in the arbitration,141 to designate an institution (or none) 
to conduct the arbitration, and so on.  Further, the principle extends 
to the enforcement of agreements made by the parties not only in the 
arbitration agreement itself, but also after an arbitration is initiated 
under the agreement.142  Among the Court’s recent decisions, Oxford 
Health Plans makes this most clear.  This case held that when the 
parties consented after the arbitration had started to let the arbitrator 
decide whether class arbitration was allowed under the agreement, 
they could and should be held to that consent and bound to the 
arbitrator’s ruling that it was allowed.143  Similarly, courts can and 
should enforce evident-partiality waivers agreed to after arbitration 
proceedings begin, but before the arbitration hearing occurs. 
                                                          
 139. It is possible that the express-waiver procedure could be specified in the 
parties’ arbitration agreement itself, though I believe that would be less desirable 
than a waiver agreed to after disclosures but before the arbitration begins, because 
the consent to the waiver would be more informed and meaningful.  See infra Part 
III.E (suggesting that consent between parties is more meaningful when agreed upon 
before arbitration has begun). 
 140. See generally Curtin, supra note 95, at 367 (arguing that “the contractual 
limitation of judicial review tends to promote the overall goals of both the FAA and 
the New York Convention”). 
 141. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013) 
(enforcing parties’ agreement disallowing class arbitration).  But see generally David 
Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 493–96 (arguing that courts’ 
interpretation of FAA to allow parties to create their own procedural regimes violates 
Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine). 
 142. See, e.g., Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2066 (2013) (holding 
that class arbitration is allowed when arbitration agreement was silent on the 
question but the parties agreed to let the arbitrator decide whether class arbitration 
was allowed).  
 143. Id. 
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The express-waiver concept is not only supported by the 
jurisprudence, but also finds support in many arbitral rules, which 
allow the parties to modify the arbitral procedures by mutual 
consent.144  These general provisions allowing for modification by 
consent would on their face allow parties to adopt this Article’s 
proposal for a prearbitration procedure to agree to a waiver.  They 
also implicitly support the idea that the waiver should be enforced in 
court, as part of the broader judicial willingness to allow parties to 
choose their own arbitration procedures, and enforce those choices 
in court.145 
In addition, the use of waivers also promotes efficiency, flexibility 
and finality—all among the principal policy justifications for 
arbitration.146  Using express waivers allows parties to opt out of the 
judicial disarray over evident-partiality doctrine, and the associated 
costs of protracted, expensive, and uncertain evident-partiality 
challenges in much the same way that arbitration doctrine writ large 
allows parties to opt out of the costs and inefficiencies of litigation. 
Further, since the waiver would be agreed to only after the parties 
were satisfied that they had no objections to the arbitrator’s serving 
based on anything disclosed by the arbitrator, there would be 
correspondingly little loss in the way of fairness or fullness of 
disclosure.147  Put another way, the parties would get the disclosure 
they want, and save a great deal of anguish and expense on the back 
end after the award is issued.148 
                                                          
 144. See, e.g., JAMS STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES R. 2 (Judicial 
Arbitration & Mediation Servs., Inc. 2009); UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES Art. 1 
(United Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 2010), (“[D]isputes shall be settled in 
accordance with these Rules subject to such modification as the parties may agree.”); 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION art. 19(1) (United 
Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 2006), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf 
/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf (“Subject to the provisions of 
this Law, the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral 
tribunal in conducting the proceedings.”).  
 145. See, e.g., Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2308 (rejecting the notion that courts 
may invalidate arbitration agreements on the grounds that they do not permit class 
arbitration of a federal-law claim); Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct. at 2066 (explaining 
that class arbitration is a matter of consent with limited judicial review).  But see 
Horton, supra note 141, at 495 (criticizing this phenomenon). 
 146. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010) 
(listing “lower costs, greater efficiency and speed” as the purposes of arbitration); 
Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 683 (7th Cir. 1983) (describing the 
FAA’s purpose as “making arbitration a swift, inexpensive, and effective substitute for 
judicial dispute resolution.”); Freyermuth, supra note 10, at 477 (“The most evident 
objective sought by parties in choosing arbitration is efficiency.”). 
 147. See infra Part III.A (discussing that parties would have an opportunity to ask 
questions regarding an arbitrator’s partiality). 
 148. Of course, after the fact, the losing party will likely regret having given away 
the right to mount an evident partiality challenge.  See generally Robertson, supra note 
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III. OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES 
A. Waivers Would Thwart the Policy of Full and Fair Disclosure 
One likely objection to the use of express waivers is that allowing 
waivers will thwart the policy of full and fair disclosure by arbitrators, 
which is the most important aspect of the doctrine of evident 
partiality.149  Some courts, particularly those invalidating an award for 
evident partiality, emphasize that a policy of full disclosure is the 
most important rationale for the evident-partiality doctrine.150  Often, 
these courts state that under a proper reading of evident partiality, 
and the underlying full-disclosure policy, arbitrators should err on 
the side of the disclosure rather than nondisclosure.151 
This policy is the counterweight to the policies of efficiency and 
finality that support limiting the avenues for arbitral challenge and 
for imposing a high bar on arbitration challenges,152 including 
evident partiality.153  Many full-disclosure courts argue that 
                                                          
109, at 1735 (“At Time 2 one must ‘pay the alligator,’ even if one has second 
thoughts about the earlier choice and wishes a different commitment had been 
made.”).  But the main point is that much like arbitration itself, using express waivers 
can harness the parties’ ex ante eagerness for a final and efficient resolution of their 
dispute to limit the ex post availability of means to challenge the result, with an 
overall increase in efficiency in dispute resolution.  In addition, the losing party will 
save itself, in a way, from the expense and time spent pursuing an evident-partiality 
challenge.  Id.  
 149. See, e.g., Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
668 F.3d 60, 78 (2d Cir. 2012) (acknowledging “the importance of timely and full 
disclosure by arbitrators”); New Regency Prods., Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, Inc., 
501 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he ‘arbitration process functions best’ 
where early and full arbitrator disclosure fosters ‘an amicable and trusting 
atmosphere’ conducive to ‘voluntary compliance with the decree.’ “ (quoting 
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) (White, 
J., concurring))).  
 150. See, e.g., Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 1994) (overturning an 
award, and holding that “[r]equiring arbitrators to make investigations in certain 
circumstances gives arbitrators an incentive to be forthright with the parties, honestly 
disclosing what arbitrators might otherwise have an incentive to hide”). 
 151. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. TUCO Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 637 (Tex. 1997) 
(“While a neutral arbitrator need not disclose relationships or connections that are 
trivial, the conscientious arbitrator should err in favor of disclosure.”).  
 152. See, e.g., Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013) (“Under 
the FAA, courts may vacate an arbitrator’s decision only in very unusual 
circumstances.  That limited judicial review, we have explained, maintain[s] 
arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.  If parties could take 
full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals, arbitration would become merely a prelude to 
a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process.” (alterations in 
original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. 
v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 (2010) (“Petitioners contend that 
the decision of the arbitration panel must be vacated, but in order to obtain that 
relief, they must clear a high hurdle.”).   
 153. See, e.g., Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 683 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(discussing the narrow standards for judicial intervention of the arbitration process 
even when losing parties bring evident-partiality challenges). 
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requiring robust up-front disclosure (with vigorous policing of that 
disclosure in court) is not only fairest but also most efficient.  They 
argue that the best way to reduce inefficient judicial evident-
partiality challenges is a pro-disclosure rule, on the theory that if 
arbitrators understand that they should err on the side of 
disclosure, they will consistently do so and courts will have to do 
less post-award policing of the disclosure line.154 
Based on these policies, it might be argued that allowing or 
encouraging express waivers is counter-productive insofar as these 
waivers undermine the policies of full, fair, and up-front disclosure.  
If waivers were common, arbitrators could withhold relevant 
information in their disclosures, safe in the knowledge that the 
parties will have waived any ability to challenge their service for 
evident partiality based on the withheld information. 
There are a few satisfactory responses to this objection, however.  
One is that arbitrators already have an independent ethical duty to 
make full and fair disclosures,155 which they would be violating by 
withholding information from their disclosures to parties to an 
arbitration.  In addition, arbitrators also have strong reputational 
incentives to be forthcoming in their disclosures.  An arbitrator who 
is thought of as partial, and especially one who is perceived to be 
dishonest in disclosure, is unlikely to be a very popular arbitrator.156 
Further, the waiver procedure described above actually would 
increase the fullness and fairness of disclosures, in a way specifically 
targeted to the parties’ actual concerns.157  That is, routine use of an 
express-waiver procedure in arbitrations would focus the parties’ 
attention more intently on the arbitrator’s disclosures, and lead them 
to elicit follow-up information about relationships that might bother 
them, precisely because they know that failure to investigate will 
mean giving up their opportunity to challenge the arbitrator based 
on the relationship.  Express waivers would focus the parties’ 
                                                          
 154. See, e.g., TUCO, 960 S.W.2d at 637 (“The rule of full disclosure minimizes the 
role of the judiciary, vesting greater control in the parties who have chosen the 
arbitration process. If faithfully adhered to, it will ultimately lead to fewer post-
decision challenges to awards based on bias or prejudice.”). 
 155. See supra note 19 (finding examples of ethical rules or canons prescribing this 
duty from various different arbitration rules). 
 156. See, e.g., Bowles Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1013 
(10th Cir. 1994) (“[A]rbitrators [are] selected because of their reputations for truth 
and fairness and for their expertise.”). 
 157. See supra Part II.A (suggesting that waivers would incentivize parties to look 
into arbitrator’s potential partiality prior to arbitration); see also TUCO, 960 S.W.2d at 
637 (implying that the goal of the disclosure rule should be to “vest[] greater control 
in the parties who have chosen the arbitration process”).  
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attention on the disclosure process in a way the currently muddled 
doctrine of constructive waiver cannot.158 
Express waivers will also increase efficiency in a way that a full-
disclosure rule will not.  Despite what some courts have said, the idea 
that erring on the side of disclosure will reduce judicial evident-
partiality challenges seems to simply be incorrect, as even 
jurisdictions endorsing a “full disclosure” standard experience a great 
deal of litigation and uncertain results.159 
Finally, in addition to noting that using express waivers will not 
thwart the policy of fair disclosure, it is important to note that there 
are other policy goals to be served besides simply requiring absolute 
disclosure, as some versions of the evident-partiality doctrine seem to 
encourage.160  Disclosure takes time and has costs161, and policies of 
efficiency and finality argue against a disclosure standard that 
requires close judicial scrutiny or whether the arbitrator disclosed as 
much as possible.162  A rule that requires total and fulsome disclosure 
opens the door to evident-partiality challenges that are merely 
arguments about whether the arbitrator gave enough details about a 
relationship, and originate from disappointment with the result.163 
In contrast, a procedure of disclosure, follow-up, and sealing the 
disclosure process with a waiver allows the parties to choose their own 
                                                          
 158. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text (noting current uncertainty in 
constructive waiver doctrine). 
 159. For example, the Texas Supreme Court’s assertion that a “rule of full 
disclosure minimizes the role of the judiciary,” TUCO, 960 S.W.2d at 637, seems to be 
belied by the amount of evident-partiality litigation brought in Texas courts (and 
reaching Texas’s appellate courts) under TUCO’s rule.  See, e.g., Ponderosa Pine 
Energy, LLC v. Tenaska Energy, Inc., 376 S.W.3d 358 (Tex. App. 2012) (entertaining 
an evident-partiality challenge even after full disclosure by an arbitrator); Karlseng v. 
Cooke, 346 S.W.3d 85, 87–93 (Tex. App. 2011) (remanding arbitration award after 
finding of evident-partiality); Skidmore Energy, Inc. v. Maxus (U.S.) Exploration Co., 
345 S.W.3d 672 (Tex. App. 2011) (accepting an arbitration award as valid and 
binding over objections by the losing party); Amoco D.T. Co. v. Occidental Petrol. 
Corp., 343 S.W.3d 837 (Tex. App. 2011) (overturning a binding arbitration award 
based on evident-partiality). 
 160. See, e.g., New Regency Prods., Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, Inc., 501 F.3d 
1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2007) (“While we are cognizant of the public interest in efficient 
and final arbitration, we believe that a rule encouraging arbitrators to err on the side 
of disclosure is consistent with that interest.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
TUCO, 960 S.W.2d at 637 (“While a neutral arbitrator need not disclose 
relationships or connections that are trivial, the conscientious arbitrator should 
err in favor of disclosure.”)  
 161. See, e.g., Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151 
(1968) (White, J., concurring) (“[The arbitrator] cannot be expected to provide the 
parties with his complete and unexpurgated business biography.”). 
 162. See supra notes 49–59 and accompanying text (explaining these competing 
policies and courts’ attempts to balance them in the evident-partiality case law). 
 163. See, e.g., ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 500 (4th Cir. 
1999) (“The approach proposed by ANR would permit a ‘disgruntled party’ to seize 
upon an undisclosed relationship ‘as a pretext for invalidating the award.’”). 
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level of scrutiny into details, and then closes the door on judicial 
challenges attempting later to argue that more should have been 
provided.  The other interests at stake, including the policies of 
efficiency, certainty, and finality, can outweigh the policy goal of total 
disclosure, or at least they should be allowed to outweigh it when the 
parties themselves so choose, based on the fundamental arbitral 
principle of consent.164  That is, the express-waiver procedure allows 
the parties to consensually balance the competing policies for 
themselves, rather than being at the mercy of the courts’ confused 
and confusing attempts to do so.  This is wholly consistent with the 
more basic principle that arbitration should be promoted as a way for 
parties to similarly, by mutual consent, avoid the vagaries, expenses, 
and uncertainties of judicial proceedings in general.165 
B. Waivers Would Sanction Fraud by Arbitrators and Parties 
A related, and perhaps more serious objection, is that waivers 
would not only discourage full disclosure, they would allow and 
sanction fraud on the part of arbitrators.  That is, if waivers were 
commonly used and enforced by courts, arbitrators could willfully 
withhold material information about their relationships with parties, 
or even deliberately omit them entirely, tricking unsuspecting parties 
who would then be stuck with the waiver even if they later discovered 
the fraud.  While most evident-partiality cases indicate that at most an 
arbitrator was remiss or less than forthcoming in their disclosures, 
there are some cases with facts strongly suggesting that the arbitrator 
and one party were indeed willfully deceiving the other party.166  
Further, it could be argued that if waivers became more common, 
arbitrators would become more brazen, because they would be less 
likely to be caught and held to account. 
There are two compelling responses to this objection.  One is that 
fraud is itself an enumerated ground for challenging an arbitral 
                                                          
 164. See supra Part II.C (explaining the fundamental role of consent in 
providing theoretical justification for the enforcement of express waivers of 
evident-partiality challenges). 
 165. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 
(2010) (“In bilateral arbitration, parties forgo the procedural rigor and appellate 
review of the courts in order to realize the benefits of private dispute resolution:  
lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert 
adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.”).  
 166. See, e.g., Karlseng v. Cooke, 346 S.W.3d 85, 87–93 (Tex. App. 2011) 
(arbitrator—a former judge—failed to disclose his relationship with one of the 
parties’ attorneys and introduced himself to the attorney at the arbitration hearing as 
if he were a stranger even though the attorney and arbitrator had a close, extensive 
personal friendship that included the attorney giving valuable gifts to the arbitrator). 
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award under the FAA.167  Another is that use of “narrow” waivers 
endorsed by this Article would be much less likely to sanction fraud, 
because such waivers would only waive challenges based on 
relationships that were disclosed by the arbitrator.168  The ability to 
perpetrate a fraud would be much reduced, and much riskier, if the 
arbitrator attempted to do so by making a partial or misleading 
disclosure of a material relationship, because the attempt to mislead 
could be easily uncovered by a party’s asking questions about it.169 
C. Waivers Would or Should Be Unenforceable Under Statute                      
or Arbitral Rules 
Another potential objection is that express waivers of evident-
partiality objections would be forbidden or unenforceable under 
statute or under specific arbitral rule sets.  However, the FAA does 
not prohibit the practice, and the statute’s purposes, as read in the 
most recent decisions of the Supreme Court, seem instead to 
encourage it.  Similarly, the practice would not be at odds with most 
arbitral rules, and many arbitral rule sets explicitly allow or 
encourage express waivers. 
1. Use of express waivers of partiality challenges does not contradict the FAA 
Nothing in the FAA expressly forbids parties from agreeing to 
waive a challenge based on evident partiality.  Nor is there any 
language in the statute expressly authorizing such waivers.170  The 
question, then, is whether the statute should be read to forbid or 
authorize such waivers, and the better view is that it does not 
forbid them.171 
Courts should not read into the FAA a prohibition on such waivers 
for the reasons of practical usefulness and theoretical soundness that 
are explained above.172  Moreover, the constructive-waiver doctrine 
                                                          
 167. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (2012) (allowing vacatur “where the award was procured 
by . . . fraud”). 
 168. See supra notes 104–106 and accompanying text (discussing the difference 
between narrower and broader forms of waiver). 
 169. See, e.g., Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC v. Tenaska Energy, Inc., 376 S.W.3d 
358, 372 (Tex. App. 2012) (holding that “a few basic and obvious questions posted to 
[the arbitrator] when the disclosure was received would have adduced the very 
information that they are now complaining about”). 
 170. In contrast, the English Arbitration Act of 1996, c. 23, §§ 5, 6(1), 69(1) 
(Eng.), does have express language allowing parties to waive (in writing) the right to 
judicial review.  See generally Curtin, supra note 95, at 358 (examining the use and 
enforcement of these “exclusion agreements” under English law).  
 171. See Curtin, supra note 95, at 367 (arguing that contractual limitation of 
judicial review is consistent with the purposes of the FAA).  
 172. See supra Part II. 
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that is already applied and enforced by most courts (albeit 
inconsistently) implies that courts have already concluded that 
parties can waive an objection based on evident-partiality.173  There is 
no principled reason that parties should not be able to achieve 
expressly by mutual consent what they may do constructively and 
unilaterally by failing to timely object.174 
Instead, limiting the scope of judicial challenge to arbitration 
awards by mutual agreement is supported by recent Supreme Court 
decisions interpreting the FAA.  These decisions have consistently 
supported judicial enforcement of party agreements about what 
procedures and challenges should be available in and after the 
arbitration,175 at least to the extent that these limit, rather than 
expand, judicial review.176  The Court’s class-arbitration decisions 
have made clear that the FAA even elevates the parties’ mutual 
                                                          
 173. See, e.g., Kiernan v. Piper Jaffray Cos., 137 F.3d 588, 593 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(“While they did not have full knowledge of all the relationships to which they now 
object, they did have concerns about Powers’ impartiality and yet chose to have her 
remain on the panel rather than spend time and money investigating further until 
losing the arbitration.”); DT-Trak Consulting, Inc. v. Prue, 814 N.W.2d 804, 809–10 
(S.D. 2012) (“[T]he well accepted rule in arbitration cases is that a party who fails to 
raise a claim of partiality against an arbitrator prior to or during the arbitration 
proceeding is deemed to have waived the right to challenge the decision based on 
‘evident partiality.’” (quoting Daiichi Haw. Real Estate Corp. v. Lichter, 82 P.3d 411, 
431–32 (Haw. 2003))); Kendall Builders, Inc. v. Chesson, 149 S.W.3d 796, 804 (Tex. 
App. 2004) (“[A] party can waive an otherwise valid objection to the partiality of the 
arbitrator by proceeding with arbitration despite knowledge of facts giving rise to 
such an objection.”). 
 174. Some courts have held that in fact there can be no waiver unless the 
challenging party knew all the facts about the challenged relationship.  See, e.g., 
Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1204 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Waiver 
applies only where a party has acted with full knowledge of the facts.”); Apperson v. 
Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1359 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding no waiver of 
evident-partiality challenge unless challenger knew “all the facts” supporting the 
alleged bias during the proceedings).  However, these cases are in conflict with those 
recognizing that a party can waive its bias objection even if it did not know all of the 
operative facts, so long as it knew enough to give notice of the potentially 
objectionable relationship.  See, e.g., Fid. Fed. Bank, FSB v. Durga Ma Corp., 386 F.3d 
1306, 1313 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that constructive waiver by failing to timely 
object “is the better approach in light of our policy favoring the finality of arbitration 
awards”); JCI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42, 
52 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding that the party who “was put on notice of the risk when it 
signed the contract [and] chose not to inquire about the backgrounds of the 
Committee members either before or during the hearing” could not challenge on 
evident partiality grounds); Kiernan, 137 F.3d at 593 (holding that a party waives its 
right to an evident-partiality claim when the party “weigh[s] their options at the time 
of [the arbitrator’s] disclosures and chooses to go forward” with arbitration). 
 175. See, e.g., Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2066 (2013) 
(enforcing party agreement after arbitration began to let arbitrator decide whether 
the parties’ contract provided for class arbitration). 
 176. See, e.g., Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008) 
(holding that parties could not by agreement expand the available avenues for 
judicial review). 
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agreement as to the terms and procedures of the arbitration over 
contrary state laws, or federal statutes’ policy goals.177  Thus, the 
policy of enforcing the parties’ agreement that the Court has 
repeatedly identified as the fundamental bedrock of the FAA would 
support enforcing the parties’ mutual agreement to forego certain 
evident partiality challenges.  This outcome does not contradict any 
statutory policies, and is in keeping with at least some sets of 
arbitral rules.178 
Nor would it be correct to contend that, by listing certain avenues 
for challenging awards, the FAA itself contains an implicit policy that 
those avenues of challenge cannot be waived.  While the Supreme 
Court held in Hall Street Associates that parties may not increase the 
scope of judicial review beyond statutory limits by mutual consent, 
the Court’s reasoning implies that the parties may by mutual consent 
limit the scope of that review more narrowly than the statutory 
baseline.179  In Hall Street, the Court read the FAA to require 
confirmation of an award unless one of the statute’s prescribed 
exceptions applied; that is, the Court rejected the argument that 
parties to an arbitration agreement may contract for expanded 
judicial review of the award.180  In doing so, the Court noted parties’ 
ability to “tailor some, even many, features of arbitration,”181 and 
warned against expanded judicial review that would “bring 
arbitration theory to grief in postarbitration process.”182  The Court’s 
concern was expanding judicial review, not limiting it, and so Hall 
Street seems to favor a one-way ratchet that allows parties to 
tighten, but not to loosen, the scope for judicial review of an 
arbitration award.183 
Indeed, to more closely follow the Supreme Court’s decisions 
enforcing limitations on arbitration procedures, the express waiver of 
evident-partiality challenges could be written into the parties’ 
                                                          
 177. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (finding 
that the FAA preempted California state law that invalidated class action waivers as 
unconscionable); see also Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 
2309–10 (2013) (finding that a mutually agreed waiver of class arbitration trumped 
the statutory policies behind the Sherman and Clayton Acts). 
 178. See infra notes 177–80 and accompanying text. 
 179. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585–86 (2008) (rejecting Hall 
Street’s request for general review of an arbitrator’s decision). 
 180. Id. at 587. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 588. 
 183. Id.; see also Curtin, supra note 95, at 367 (“[W]hile the contractual limitation 
of judicial review tends to promote the overall goals of both the FAA and the New 
York Convention, contractual expansion tends to contradict, at least in part, some of 
the goals of the FAA and the New York Convention.”). 
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arbitration agreement itself, through the inclusion of a clause stating 
that all evident-partiality challenges are waived after arbitrators are 
appointed and the disclosure process is completed without objection 
from either side.  This alternative would have the advantage of 
making the mutual decision to forego any evident-partiality 
challenges part of the parties’ arbitration contract, which the 
Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed is paramount.184  This 
approach, however, would commit the parties to the waiver before 
the disclosure process had taken place, which would have significant 
disadvantages.185  But the broader point is that there is room for 
flexibility as to the timing of the waiver, and parties could tailor the 
procedure to fit their own specific needs.186 
2. Use of express waivers is supported by arbitral rules allowing parties to 
modify procedures by consent 
The provisions of various arbitral rules also support the use of 
express-waiver procedure to eliminate certain evident-partiality 
challenges.  As an initial matter, in an ad hoc arbitration, parties 
would be free to adopt a waiver procedure, since the definition of ad 
hoc arbitration is that parties may adopt their own procedures.187  
Beyond that, many sets of arbitral rules make clear that the parties 
may modify the arbitration procedures by consent.188  These types of 
                                                          
 184. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773–
74 (2010) (“Whether enforcing an agreement to arbitrate or construing an 
arbitration clause, courts and arbitrators must ‘give effect to the contractual rights 
and expectations of the parties.’” (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of 
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989))).  
 185. Disadvantages include eliminating the parties’ flexibility to tinker with the 
scope of the waiver after disclosures have been made, see infra Part III.D, and 
reducing the degree to which consent to the waiver is meaningful and informed, see 
infra Part III.E. 
 186. See generally infra Part III.D (discussing the potential for flexibility in the scope 
of the waiver). 
 187. See, e.g., Slate, supra note 27, at 52–53 (describing how parties in ad hoc 
arbitration must either develop their own rules or adopt standard rules such as 
UNCITRAL rules).  Even if the article’s proposal were limited to ad hoc arbitrations, 
however, a substantial amount of arbitrations would be covered.  See, e.g., CHARTERED INST. 
OF ARBITRATORS, CIArb Costs of International Arbitration Survey 2011, 7 (2011), available at 
http://www.ciarb.org/conferences/costs/2011/09/28/CIArb%20costs%20of%20 
International%20Arbitration%20Survey%202011.pdf (discussing a study undertaken 
by the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators in which, out of 254 international 
arbitrations, sixty-two percent were administered by institutions and thirty-eight 
percent were ad hoc). 
 188. See, e.g., JAMS STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES R. 2 (Judicial 
Arbitration & Mediation Servs., Inc. 2009) (“The Parties may agree on any 
procedures not specified herein or in lieu of these Rules that are consistent with the 
applicable law and JAMS policies . . . .  The Parties shall promptly notify JAMS of any 
such Party-agreed procedures and shall confirm such procedures in writing.  The 
Party-agreed procedures shall be enforceable as if contained in these Rules.”); 
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provisions would clearly allow parties to adopt a procedure for 
agreeing to an express waiver of evident-partiality challenges. 
Moreover, some rules, notably the UNCITRAL rules, go even 
further and specify that the parties may agree to waive any recourse 
to judicial authority to challenge the award, so far as such a waiver is 
consistent with applicable law.189  That is, the rules specifically 
endorse the idea of an agreed party waiver of judicial review.190 
D. Narrow Waivers Would Not Do Enough and Broad Waivers Would Do 
Too Much 
Another set of objections are practical:  narrow waivers would not 
accomplish much because they would only limit challenges that can 
be disposed of using constructive-waiver doctrine, while broad 
waivers would accomplish too much by eliminating compelling 
partiality challenges. 
It might be argued that narrow waivers that merely forbid 
challenges based on disclosed relationships would not accomplish 
anything of value.  Since constructive-waiver doctrine exists, it is 
already the case that any challenges based on disclosed relationships 
will or should fail.  However, this argument ignores the fact that 
constructive-waiver doctrine is inconsistently applied from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, or trial court to trial court.  Further, 
courts can and do bypass the doctrine and perform a straightforward 
evident-partiality analysis, even when an institutional arbitrator has 
                                                          
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION Art. 19(1) (United 
Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 2006) (“Subject to the provisions of this Law, 
the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal 
in conducting the proceedings.”). 
 189. UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES Annex (Possible Waiver Statement) (United 
Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 2010) (“If the parties wish to exclude recourse 
against the arbitral award that may be available under the applicable law, they may 
consider adding a provision to that effect as suggested below, considering, however, 
that the effectiveness and conditions of such an exclusion depend on the applicable 
law.”).  “Applicable law” in this context would mean the law of the nation in whose 
courts the award would be enforced; so, in this case, American law and specifically 
the FAA. 
 190. Finally, to the extent any extant arbitral rules do prohibit such waivers, or 
prescribe procedures that would conflict with an express-waiver procedure, those 
rules could be revisited or revised.  See, e.g., Paul D. Friedland & John M. Townsend, 
Commentary on the July 2003 Revisions to the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, DISP. 
RESOL. J., Nov. 2003–Jan. 2004, at 8 (describing revision of AAA commercial-
arbitration rules by AAA); Andrew P. Tuck, Investor-State Arbitration Revised:  A Critical 
Analysis of the Revisions and Proposed Reforms to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 885, 913 (2007) (describing the rule-revision process 
for the UNCITRAL rules). 
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already expressed a view in the arbitration that any challenges based 
on a particular, disclosed relationship would be waived.191 
Further, even if most constructive-waiver defenses were successful, 
using an express waiver is an excellent way to avoid the cost and 
expense of litigating long-shot partiality challenges at the trial and 
potentially appellate level.  Indeed, waivers should be especially 
efficient if most constructive-waiver defenses are successful, since 
these are a particularly inefficient and wasteful form of challenge.  
This is because, ex ante, a party might well rationally decide to forego 
such low-probability challenges even in the event that they lose the 
arbitration, whereas ex post the incentives change and a party might 
bring them even though they are unlikely to succeed.192 
Relatedly, it might be argued that litigation of waivers of 
“disclosed” relationships would simply collapse into arguing about 
whether the relationship was sufficiently disclosed, which is the same 
thing as conducting a constructive-waiver analysis.  However, the 
existence of an agreed waiver would add significant clarity to the 
analysis, and leave parties less at the mercy of the conflicting 
jurisprudence about how much information is enough.193  Using 
waivers would harness the gap between pre- and post- award 
incentives to eliminate a significant number of costly and expensive 
                                                          
 191. See ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 496–502 (4th Cir. 
1999) (observing the AAA stated prior to the arbitration that “[u]nless we are advised 
to the contrary . . . we will assume that the Parties waive any presumption of bias by 
the Arbitrator based on this disclosure,” the losing party filed an evident-partiality 
objection after the award, and the court undertook an evident-partiality analysis 
rather than discussing the waiver). 
 192. After the loss, the answer would likely be different, because a low-hope 
challenge is better than no hope, and also because often there is significant value to 
the losing party in the mere fact of being able to delay enforcement of the award 
through collateral litigation.  But the value of delay is not one sanctioned by 
arbitration doctrine; instead, is very much what those policies and doctrines aim to 
prevent.  See, e.g., Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 42 (10th Cir. 1986) (“Because a 
primary purpose behind arbitration agreements is to avoid the expense and delay of 
court proceedings, it is well settled that judicial review of an arbitration award is very 
narrowly limited.” (citations omitted)); Pinnacle Museum Tower Ass’n v. Pinnacle 
Mkt. Dev. (US), LLC, 282 P.3d 1217, 1231 (Cal. 2012) (noting that public policy 
“strongly favors” arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of 
dispute resolution). 
 193. See, e.g., JCI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 
F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2003) (declining to find evident-partiality when the party that 
lost arbitration claims disclosures beforehand were not thorough enough); Apperson 
v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1359 (6th Cir. 1989) (same); Kiernan v. Piper 
Jaffray Cos., 137 F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 1998) (same); see also supra notes 67–69 and 
accompanying text (discussing the uncertainty over constructive-waiver doctrine).  
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challenges, and do so in a way that is most likely to eliminate the most 
worthless or inefficient challenges.194 
Conversely, it might be argued that if parties used the “broad” form 
of waiver,195 waiving all evident-partiality challenges including those 
based on relationships entirely undisclosed by the arbitrator, waivers 
would go too far.  As mentioned, the Article to this point has focused 
on narrower waivers in which the parties would agree only to waive 
evident-partiality challenges as to relationships disclosed by the 
arbitrator.  And blanket, broad waivers would be more problematic 
because they raise the prospect of situations where the arbitrator 
deliberately fails to disclose a relationship with an obvious potential 
for partiality, for which there are no consequences on the basis of a 
blanket waiver.196  The potential for fraud and unfairness in this 
situation is much greater. 
Such waivers could be enforced, at least absent a showing that the 
waiver itself was induced by fraud,197 but they would be more 
problematic, and therefore, should be disfavored as compared to a 
more limited waiver of challenges based on disclosed relationships.  
While express waivers of all evident-partiality challenges certainly 
would increase finality and efficiency, as well as arbitrator peace of 
mind, the trade off in terms of potential for fraud and misconduct 
would simply be too great. 
However, while overly broad blanket waivers would be undesirable, 
this does raise the related point that there is room for flexibility in 
the scope of the waiver, which could be used to increase efficiency 
and finality through the parties’ mutual consent.  For example, a 
waiver might provide for foregoing evident partiality challenges based 
not only on disclosed relationships but also on any relationships that 
were undisclosed but unknown to the arbitrator.  This would reduce 
and clarify post-award litigation raising challenges based on 
relationships unknown to the arbitrator.  If the defender could show 
the arbitrator did not know about the relationship, the challenge 
                                                          
 194. See supra Part II.B (arguing that pre-arbitration waivers of evident-partiality 
claims will encourage parties to seek arbitration and discourage parties to appeal 
arbitration awards). 
 195. See supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text (comparing broad and 
narrow forms of waiver).  
 196. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. TUCO Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex. 1997) 
(noting that the arbitrator knew, but did not disclose, that his acquisition of a case 
stemmed from a referral which involved his co-arbitrator’s law firm); see also Olson v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 51 F.3d 157, 159 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(asserting arbitrator did not disclose his job titles nor his employer’s business 
relationship with Merrill Lynch).  
 197. See supra Part III.B (discussing how express waivers could be overcome in 
cases where the waiver can be shown to have been induced by fraud).  
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would fail.198  By consent, parties would create clarity in advance 
about the significance of unknown relationships that, if otherwise left 
to resolution by litigation, would face numerous questions:  
uncertainty and judicial division over whether evident partiality can 
be established by showing the arbitrator’s “constructive knowledge” 
of a material relationship or whether the arbitrator has an 
independent duty to investigate and discover potential conflicts.199 
The broader point is that express waivers would allow the parties to 
tailor for themselves what kind of evident-partiality challenges to 
allow and forbid, rather than being at the mercy of different courts’ 
interpretation and application of the doctrine.  And that sort of 
flexibility through mutual consent is directly in line with arbitration’s 
fundamental policy justifications and its mission to let the parties 
contract out of judicial procedures they find inefficient.200 
E. Narrowing Avenues for Challenging Arbitration Awards Is Generally 
Undesirable 
While mostly beyond the scope of this Article, one last objection is 
worth briefly addressing.  It might be argued that, even if express 
waivers of evident partiality challenges are an effective way to reduce 
the volume of litigation challenging arbitral awards, such a result is 
undesirable.  Many have criticized the Supreme Court’s 
proarbitration trend, which includes limiting ways to challenge 
awards.201  These critics point out that making arbitral results harder 
to challenge is undesirable because of unfairness in the way 
arbitration agreements are formed, in particular unequal bargaining 
power to enter arbitration agreements in consumer or employment 
                                                          
 198. See, e.g., Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 
146 F.3d 1309, 1312–13 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that there is no independent 
duty to investigate under the FAA where the arbitrator is unaware of the 
undisclosed facts). 
 199. Compare Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
“though [the arbitrator] lacked actual knowledge, he had constructive knowledge of 
[the undisclosed relationship],” which was enough to find evident partiality), with Al-
Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85 F.3d 680, 682–83 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that, because 
the arbitrator did not have actual knowledge of the undisclosed relationship, there 
was no evident partiality even though the arbitrator did not conduct an investigation 
to uncover such a relationship). 
 200. See supra Part III.C (arguing that the purposes of arbitration are to 
individualize resolution and avoid the rigid procedural necessities that come 
with litigation). 
 201. But see Tom Ginsburg, The Arbitrator as Agent:  Why Deferential Review Is Not 
Always Pro-arbitration, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1013, 1026 (2010) (arguing that “deferential 
review . . . is not always pro-arbitration”). 
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contexts.202  They also often criticize as misreadings of the FAA and 
prior arbitration case law the Roberts Court’s recent decisions 
making arbitration awards harder to challenge and rigorously enforcing 
party agreements to forego procedures such as class arbitration, on 
which this Article has relied for the theoretical justifications for 
enforcing express waivers of evident-partiality challenges.203 
If the trend towards making arbitration awards harder to challenge 
(and making more claims arbitrable) is undesirable, then perhaps 
using express waivers of evident partiality to further reduce avenues 
to challenge arbitral awards would simply be reinforcing that bad 
trend.  While it is not this Article’s main purpose to consider broader 
critiques of the Supreme Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence, a 
few responses can be offered to this objection. 
First, to the extent critiques of the current trends in arbitration 
case law are based on the argument that “consent” to arbitration is a 
fiction, or based on coercion,204 the force of this argument is reduced 
as applied to waivers that are agreed to after arbitration has begun.  
This is because it will be more apparent to the parties that there is a 
real dispute and that waiving rights will have consequences for that 
dispute.205  That is, the consent will be more meaningful. 
                                                          
 202. See, e.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer 
Contracts:  A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237 (2001) (discussing the negative 
effects of binding mandatory arbitration in consumer or employment contexts); 
Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial Institutions:  A 
Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP RES. 267 (1995) 
(questioning mandatory binding arbitration as a matter of public policy); David S. 
Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1252–53 
(2009) (arguing that mandatory arbitration agreements are unfair when the parties 
agreeing have unequal bargaining power); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory 
Arbitration:  Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005) (discussing the impact that 
mandatory binding arbitration has on the individual parties); Wilson, supra note 86, 
at 107–09.  But see Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL. 549, 
552 (2008) (“[T]he proper question then, is whether eliminating predispute 
arbitration agreements for wide swaths of the economy yields a net benefit.  That is 
the burden confronting advocates of arbitration reform and one that, based on my 
review of the available empirical evidence, they have not met.”); David Sherwyn et al., 
Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration:  A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. 
L. REV. 1557, 1578 (2005) (“[T]here is no evidence that plaintiffs fare significantly 
better in litigation.”). 
 203. See, e.g., Bermann supra note 130, at 909 (critiquing the Court for being 
willing to override “established understandings in the U.S. law of arbitration”). 
 204. See generally Horton, supra note 141, at 487 (arguing that in consumer and 
employment contexts, arbitration clauses are not the product of actual consent). 
 205. The concern is not entirely eliminated, since the imbalances in sophistication 
or bargaining power at the root of some of these concerns, see, e.g., Horton, supra 
note 138, at 487, will still be present after the arbitration process has started. 
However, once the arbitration has begun, and especially if the claimant has counsel, 
the implications of agreeing to a waiver should be much more salient than the 
implications of agreeing to arbitration as part of a boilerplate consumer or 
employment agreement.  This is one reason to favor a waiver process that takes place 
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Second, even if it is generally undesirable to reduce substantive 
avenues to challenge arbitral awards, expand the domain of claims 
that can be arbitrated, and increase parties’ ability to restrict available 
procedural vehicles in arbitration, evident-partiality doctrine is not a 
good solution to these ills.206  The evident-partiality doctrine is not 
meant to serve as a general safety valve for arbitration, and using it in 
that way produces significant inefficiencies.  It leads to collateral 
litigation flyspecking the arbitrator’s disclosures and second-guessing 
her impartiality, which has little to do with the bases of most critiques 
of the Court’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence.207  The policies served by 
evident-partiality and disclosure doctrine—ensuring a neutral 
tribunal in the most procedurally efficient way—do not directly speak 
to whether it is fair to arbitrate at all, to disallow certain procedures, 
or to force arbitration of particular types of substantive claims.  
Instead, these ills are best addressed legislatively, through 
amendment of the FAA.208 
Further, the uncertainty in evident-partiality doctrine opens up this 
inefficient litigation in all sorts of arbitrations, including ones where 
arbitration was agreed to by two sophisticated parties of relatively 
equal bargaining power.  Indeed, many evident-partiality cases are 
these types of cases, in part because it is often the sophisticated party 
that has the savvy resources, and incentive to pursue litigation to try 
                                                          
after arbitration has begun, but before the arbitration hearing starts, rather than 
writing waiver language into arbitration agreements themselves.  See supra note 185 
and accompanying text.  
 206. Cf. Bruhl, supra note 78, at 1422 (noting the “sort of hydraulic pressure in the 
system that will seek release through whatever channel still exists for invalidating, or 
at least limiting, arbitration agreements”). 
 207. Cf. id. at 1437–39 (analyzing the use of unconscionability doctrine as a way 
for arbitration-skeptical courts to police particular objectionable aspects of 
arbitration agreements).  
 208. There have been repeated legislative efforts, so far unsuccessful, to eliminate 
arbitration in employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil-rights disputes.  See, e.g., 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. § 402(a) (2013) (“[N]o 
predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires 
arbitration of an employment dispute, consumer dispute, antitrust dispute, or civil 
rights dispute.”); H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 
5129, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 2969, 109th Cong. 
(2005); H.R. 3809, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2435, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 2282, 
107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 815, 107th Cong. (2001); see also Sarah Rudolph Cole, On 
Babies and Bathwater:  The Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent 
Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 458 (2011) (discussing the repeated 
introduction of such legislation); Schwartz, supra note 202, at 1250 (noting that 
“there is a significant possibility that the FAA could be amended to make predispute 
arbitration clauses unenforceable in most adhesion contracts.  At this important 
juncture, . . . academic commentators are increasingly addressing themselves to 
legislators rather than courts” (footnote omitted)).  The enactment of this or a 
similar bill would not undermine this Article’s arguments for using express waivers of 
evident-partiality challenges in contexts where arbitration was allowed. 
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and unearth information that can be used to support an evident 
partiality challenge.209 
Thus, even if the criticisms of current trends in arbitration 
jurisprudence are well-taken as to their potential to harm parties to 
one-sided consumer or employment arbitration agreements, express 
waivers of evident-partiality objections would still be a useful tool.  
Express waivers are nevertheless especially valuable when 
sophisticated parties make a truly negotiated arbitration agreement 
and an informed prearbitration decision to forego potential 
expensive and uncertain evident-partiality litigation.210 
CONCLUSION 
Someday, the Supreme Court may take a case to resolve the 
current disarray in the doctrine of evident partiality.  When it does, it 
may clarify some of the pressing, vexed questions courts currently 
face about how to define and apply that doctrine.  The solution it 
selects may be drawn from the extensive body of existing scholarship 
                                                          
 209. See, e.g., Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
668 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2012) (reinsurance company versus reinsurance company); 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2005) (insurance 
company versus insurance company); Univ. Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal 
Constructors, Inc., 304 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2002) (construction company and 
insurance company versus development partnership); Fid. Fed. Bank, FSB v. Durga 
Ma Corp., 386 F.3d 1306 (9th Cir. 2004) (bank versus jewelry corporation); Crow 
Constr. v. Jeffrey M. Brown Assocs. Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 217 (E.D. Pa. 2003) 
(construction company versus general contractor); Lexington Ins. Co. & Chartis, Inc. 
v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 101 So. 3d 1190 (Ala. 2012) (insurance company versus 
construction company); U.S. Elecs., Inc. v. Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., 958 N.E.2d 891 
(N.Y. 2011) (electronics corporation versus radio corporation); Skidmore Energy, 
Inc. v. Maxus (U.S.) Exploration Co., 345 S.W.3d 672 (Tex. App. 2011) (energy 
exploration corporation versus energy exploration corporation); Amoco D.T. Co. v. 
Occidental Petrol. Corp., 343 S.W.3d 837 (Tex. App. 2011) (energy partnership 
versus energy company); GJR Mgmt. Holdings, L.P. v. Jack Raus, Ltd., 126 S.W.3d 
257 (Tex. App. 2003) (limited partnership versus construction contractor and 
subcontractor); Int’l Bank of Commerce-Brownsville v. Int’l Energy Dev. Corp., 981 
S.W.2d 38 (Tex. App. 1998) (bank versus energy development corporation).  But 
see, e.g., Nasca v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 12 P.3d 346 (Colo. App. 2000) 
(insured individual versus insurance company); Carpenter v. Brooks, 534 S.E.2d 
641 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (investor versus investment corporations); Roe v. 
Ladymon, 318 S.W.3d 502 (Tex. App. 2010) (homeowner versus home renovator 
limited liability partnership). 
 210. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:  Debunking the Supreme 
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 642–43 (1996) (“[I]t is 
critical to distinguish between commercial arbitration voluntarily agreed to by 
parties of approximately equal bargaining power, and commercial arbitration 
forced upon unknowing consumers, franchisees, employees or others through the 
use of form contracts.”).  Without taking a position on whether indeed the 
application of arbitration to consumer and employment contracts should be rolled 
back, the narrower point here is that even if it were, express waivers of evident-
partiality objections would still be a useful tool for parties that courts could and 
should enforce.  
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attempting to clarify this murky area of law.  But the prospect of 
clarification is not great, since the Court has only weighed in on 
evident-partiality once, over 40 years ago, and has not shown any 
inclination to clarify, despite the acknowledged and expanding 
disarray in lower courts. 
Until then, parties to arbitrations are left with a muddle that can 
produce costly and expensive post-award litigation.  Express waivers 
of the sort advocated for by this Article are a good way to avoid these 
challenges.  Express agreements to forego evident-partiality 
challenges have great practical attractiveness and sound theoretical 
justifications, certainly when limited to waivers of evident partiality 
challenges based on any relationship present in the arbitrator’s 
disclosures.  Therefore, parties and panels should use them and 
courts should enforce them.   
 
